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1 . Introduction. There is currently little agreement among phonologists 
as to the form which phonological rules and phonological representations 
in 'correct' grammars of natural languages should take. The term ' correct ' 
is presumably understood by most investigators as being at l east roughly 
equivalent to what Chomsky (1964, 1965) calls "descriptively adequate ." 
This latter concept ("descriptive adequacy") is, according to Chomsky 
(1964:105) , to be equated with what Sapir (1933) terms "psychological 
reality" (cf . also Chomsky 1976) . That is, modern phonologists, like 
(among others) Sapir and Chomsky, are concerned with determining the form 
in which speakers of a language store in long term memory the pronunciations 
of the lexical items of their language, and the form of the rules (if 
any) which convert the stored pronunciation into the actual pronunciation. 
To put it in slightly more technical terms, phonologists today are concerned 
with determining the nature of lexical representations (also referred 
to as underlying representations or underlying forms) and of phonological 
rules in descriptively adequate grammars of natural languages . 
Such a concern is, perhaps contrary to popular belief, not peculiar 
to generative phonology and those theories which have been influenced by 
and/or have reacted to generative phonology (e.g . , the "natural phonology" 
of Stampe 1973 , Donegan and Stampe 1979 , and the "Natural Generative 
Phonology" of Hooper 1976 and the references cited there) . Rather , 
as pointed out by Chomsky (1978:304-5) , most American structuralists, 
for example, implicitly accepted such a concern as legitimate in linguistic 
research, despite the probability that the great majority of them would 
have rejected a proposal of this nature if it was explicitly put to them. 
This must be so because the sequence of papers which appeared shows that 
a set of procedures for phonemic analysis, say , would be proposed , another 
investigator would point out that using these procedures would lead to 
an absurd result in certain cases and perhaps propose a revision of the 
original principles, etc . Unless these investigators were implicitly 
accepting a point of view very much like that which concerns itself with 
descriptive adequacy, there would appear to be no basis for claiming that 
the results in question were in fact absurd. Descriptive adequacy has 
thus been an implicit concern in most of those phonological theories in 
which a concern of this nature has not been explicit, as it has been in 
the case of generative phonology and the other current theories mentioned 
above. 
Moreover, it seems to me , it is absolutely crucial that this be 
the main concern of phonologists, unless one is willing to claim that 
the only concern of phonology is the specification of the actual pronun-
ciation of utterances . The achievement of even the latter end is , of 
course, no mean accomplishment, but by itself it is of little or no rele-
vance to ultimately more important and interesting questions having to 
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do with the nature of the human mind. That is, the ultimate concern of 
generative phonologists, in my view (and, at least implicitly, that of 
most other phonologists), is the light which the study of the phonological 
part of human language can shed on the nature of the mind. Such light 
simply cannot be shed unless we go beyond the mere specification of the 
pronunciation of utterances to concern ourselves with the way in which 
these pronunciations come about when speakers of natural languages produce 
them. 
Despite the importance of the issues addressed by modern phonology, 
there is, as noted above, little agreement concerning the resolution of 
these issues . Probably the most important reason for this lack of agree-
ment is that phonologists until quite recently (with some notable exceptions 
such as Sapir), have taken as their data almost exclusively the facts 
of pronunciation in various natural languages . For, while no one can 
deny that such facts must be considered when attempting to answer the 
questions discussed above, neither, it seems to me, can it be denied 
that there are other data which, i f they are available, cannot be neglected 
if we are to find satisfactory answers to our important questions. It 
has been well known at least since Chao (1934) (and undoubtedly well before 
then) that pronunciation data alone cannot in general supply a unique 
answer to phonological questions, even given rather specific assumptions 
about the form which such answers may take (e.g., the assumptions of classical 
phonemics) . 
It is this lack of uniqueness for solutions of phonological problems, 
of course, which has led to the current widespread disagreement among 
phonologists as to the correct answers to their questions. Recently ~Sapir 
can again be considered 'recent' in this respect), there have been sevetal 
attempts to resolve these difficulties by appealing to data other than 
the pronunciations of utterances themselves. In my opinion, it is evidenc~ 
of this type (which has been termed "external evidence" by, e.g., Botha 
1973, and "substantive evidence" by such researchers as Skousen 1975) 
which is required to settle the disputes which have arisen concerning 
whether or not proposed grammars (or parts of them) are descriptively 
adequate. 1 
Moreover, it appears to me, it is issues of this kind (i.e., at 
the level of descriptive adequacy) which can most profitably be pursued, 
given the current state of our understanding of the nature of language. 
It makes little sense to concern ourselves with the admittedly ultimately 
more philosophically profound issue (cf. the above discussion of "the 
nature of the human mind") of "explanatory adequacy" (cf., for example, 
Chomsky 1964:63) of theories of language which provide "a general basis 
for selecting a granunar which achieves" the still unc l ear level of 
descriptive adequacy . The actual practice of contemporary phonologists 
bears out this assessment: most current theoretical research is concerned 
with the descriptive adequacy of various proposed grammars, and not with 
constructing explanatorily adequate theories. Such a concern is entirely 
appropriate in my view: determination of the nature of descriptively 
adequate grammars seems clearly to be logically prior to work on explana-
torily dequate theories. 
Despite the apparently clear desirability of using "external" or 
"substantive" evidence (hereafter, simply 'external evidence') to decide 
phonological issues, there is little consensus among phonologists concern-
ing the success of arguments employing such evidence . One major reason 
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(and perhaps the most important) is that the premises of these arguments 
have been left, in many cases, implicit . When the premises of an argument 
are not made explicit, it is difficult to evaluate it, since the truth 
of the premises is a crucial concern. 2 It is therefore of considerable 
importance that these premises be made explicit, insofar as possible, 
so that they may be evaluated with respect to their truth or falsity (or, 
probably more appropriately, the likelihood of these premises). Once 
the premises of an argument have been made explicit, of course, it can 
be determined whether or not a logically valid form of inference is being 
employed, as well. 
In this pa)er, I will examine one kind of such evidence, data from 
language change, and attempt to evaluate its relevance for determining 
the descriptive adequacy (i . e ., psychological reality) of synchronic analyses 
in phonology . This kind of external evidence is particularly important, 
it seems to me , since, first of all, it has been used probably more frequently 
than any other kind, but also because, as noted by Sonunerstein (1977), 
it is perhaps the only kind of external evidence which is generally accepted 
as being relevant to synchronic analysis. The approach taken here is 
a methodological examination of four arguments which have been put forth 
in favor of certain phonological analyses, together with replies to them 
and, in one case, a methodological critique . In so doing, I will attempt 
to make explicit the premises on which these arguments are based, and 
to evaluate these premises as potential 'universals' of language change 
which could serve as a firm basis for using diachronic data in assessing 
synchronic analyses.4 Such an investigation, I feel, is long overdue, 
given the importance of the issues and the type of evidence involved, 
as well as the essential lack of any comparable work . 5 Before proceeding 
with the investigation, however, I will first give a brief sketch (section 
2) of my background assumptions about the nature of phonological systems, 
and (section 3) of a framework for discussing and evaluating scientific 
arguments. 
2. Background assumptions. In a work of a methodological character, 
it is well to make as few assumptions as possible, since the entire under-
taking could be compromised if one of the assumptions accepted should 
prove false. However, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
do work (even when it is methodological work) in a theoretical vacuum, 
and I will take this opportunity to specify what will be assumed here 
regarding the nature of the phonological component of grammars of natural 
languages. 
The assumptions made are given in (1) below . The last assumption 
(le) actually follows from (la) and (lb), but I include it here for the 
sake of clarity . 
(1) a. the physical speech signal is, at least partially, 
segmentable into discrete sequential units6 (i.e., there 
is a level which corresponds roughly to the "systematic 
phonetic" level of Chomsky and Halle 1968) 
b. there may be a level more ' abstract' than the level 
just specified in that representations at the former 
level need not correspond one-to-one to those at the 
latter (the former level will be referred to here as 
the level of 'lexical representation , ' a level which 
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may or may not be the same--perhaps depending on the 
lexical item--as the systematic phonetic level) 
c. due to the potential discrepancy between the level 
in (a) and that in (b), there may exist 'phonological 
rules' which convert representations at the latter level 
into representations at the former level. 
Many of the arguments in the literature which make use of external 
evidence are concerned with ascertaining the nature of the level of lexical 
representation, and this work will correspondingly be primarily concerned 
with this issue. 7 This issue is quite an important one, since resolving 
it often results automatically in the resolution of other issues, such 
as whether or not we are dealing with a case of "rule inversion" (cf . Venne-
mann 1972 and section 4.3 below), but it will not be my exclusive concern. 
3. On the nature of scientific argumentation. In Churma (1979, Ch. II), 
I argued that many scientific arguments can be understood as instances 
of what has come to be known as Bayesian inference (cf., for Example, 
Salmon 1967). The logical basis of this form of inference is in probability 
theory, and it can easily be shown (see Churma 1979, Appendix) that a 
formula corresponding to this form of inference follows straightforwardly 
from the axioms of the probability calculus. It can, of course, be quantified, 
but for present purposes, it will suffice to characterize Bayesian inference 
as in (2). 
(2) Unless hypothesis His true, it would be unlikely that 
piece of evidence E would occur. 
E does occur. 
Therefore, it is likely that His true. 
Of crucial importance here is how the 11unlikely" nature of Eis to be 
determined. I have argued (in some detail, since this particular view 
does not seem to have been serious.Ly considered in the logico-philosophical 
literature) in Churma (1979, Ch.II) that such determination is ultimately 
subjective in nature. Among other things, this view permits an explanation 
of how it is possible for rational investigators to disagree about the 
force of a given argument: they disagree because of incompatible beliefs 
(or degrees of belief) about the truth of the major premise in (2) . The 
following section of this paper can also be taken as an argument in favor 
of this view . 
Another straightforward consequence of the axioms of the probability 
calculus (cf. Churma 1979, Ch. II and Appendix) is what I have called 
" ' almost deductive' inference". This kind of inference resembles standard 
deductive inference (in particular, modus ponens and modus tollens), but 
here the truth of the premises need not be known more than probabilistically . 
Thus, in the case of 'almost modus ponens', we have the situation illustrated 
in (3). 
(3) If A, then Bis likely. 
A is likely . 
Therefore, Bis (somewhat) likely. 8 
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'Almost modus tollens ' takes an analogous form. Let us turn now to an 
examination of the use of data from diachrony in the justification of 
synchronic analyses. 
4. Appeals to diachronic evidence. In this section I will examine four 
sets of arguments which make use of evidence from historical change, and 
replies which have been made to each of them. After reconstructing in 
more explicit fashion the arguments and counterarguments, I will give 
some discussion of the validity of the argument forms used and (more often) 
of the truth/falsity or likelihood of the premises on which these arguments 
are based. The arguments considered are found in Kiparsky (1968) , Hooper 
(1976), Schuh (1972) and Skousen (1972, 1975); the rejoinders are from, 
respectively, Stampe (1973) , Harris (1978), Leben (1974) and Kiparsky 
(1973a, b) . A "remark" on Leben' s reply by Schuh (1974) is also given 
some atention, as is Botha ' s (1973) methodological critique of Kiparsky's 
argument. After each presentation of the relevant arguments, I will give 
some discussion of the cogency of the arguments in question. In the final 
section, I will discuss the important issue of possibly taking seriously 
some of these premises (or generalizations of them) as universal principles 
of historical change which could serve as a legitimate basis for other 
arguments which attempt to justify synchronic analyses on the basis of 
data from diachrony . 
4 . 1 . Kiparsky-Stampe-Botha . 
4 . 1.1 . Kiparsky on the brace notation . I will consider first of all 
the argument presented in Kiparsky (1968) (and reiterated in Chomsky and 
Halle 1968) in favor of the psychological reality of the brace notation. 
This argument is noteworthy in that it has received extensive , and essen-
tially negative, discussion by Botha (1973). It is also a particularly 
transparent application of the Bayesian schema (1) . Furthermore, Stampe ' s 
(1973) reply (discussed in the next subsection) explicitly acknowledges 
" the beauty of Kiparsky's argument " (Stampe 1973 : 48), although Stampe 
argues against Kiparsky ' s conclusion. It thus appears worthwhile to consider 
this argument in some detail; I reproduce below verbatim in (4) Kiparsky's 
argument (the numbering in the quotation is Kiparsky's). 
(4) In English , underlying long vowels, which are otherwise 
realized as diphthongs, are shortened in two main phono-
logical environments: before two or more consonants 
(for example, keep : kept) and in the third syllable from 
the end of the word (for example, vain :vanity, severe : 
severity). The rules which bring these shortenings about 
are the following : 
5' . V -+ [ - long] / CC 
S". V-+ [-long]/ C . . . V • •• V 
The theory of generative grammar requires that 5' and 
5'' be collapsed into a single rule as follows: 
C5. V -+ [-long]/_C{ ...v . ..v 
It asserts that of the two descriptively equivalent 
grammars, one of which contains the two rules (5' and 
5 ' ') as separate processes , and the other as a single 
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process combined into 5 by factoring out their common 
part and enclosing the remainder in braces, it is the 
latter which is the psychologically correct one. 
Rule 5 arose in Early Middle English as a gener-
alization of a much more restricted process of shortening. 
In Old English, vowels were shortened before three or 
more consonants (for example, godspell > godspell, 
~blas > brmmblas) and in the third syllable from the 
end provided they were followed by two consonants (for 
example, bledsian > bledsian). The corresponding rules 
were: 
6 1 • V + [-long]/ CCC 
6' '. V + [-long]/ CC •.. V...V 
Again, these rules must be collapsed as before: 
C6 . V -+ [-long] /_ CC { ...V...V 
On comparing the Old English rule in 6 and the Early 
Middle English (and indeed Modern English) rule in 5 we 
see that the only difference between them is that the 
later rule (5) has lost one of the required consonants 
in its environment. It represents a simpler, more general 
form of the 01d English vowel-shortening process . It 
will apply in all cases where 6 applied but also in cases 
where 6 would not have applied. Evidently the change 
from 6 to 5 is an instance of simplification, which we 
have seen to be one of the basic mechanisms of linguisti ~ 
change . But in a linguistic theory in which the brace 
notation plays no role, the relation between the Old 
English and Early Middle English shortening process is a 
different one. If the brace notation were not part of 
linguistic theory we would have two separate changes--
namely, 6' > 5' and 6' ' > 5' '--on our hands and we would 
be faced with the very peculiar fact that two separate, 
unrelated rules have undergone an identical modification 
at the same point in the history of English. 
The last sentence of this passage bears a strikingly close relationship to 
the major premise in the Bayesian schema (2) . I rephrase this sentence 
slightly here to emphasize t he parallel, as in (5) below . 
(5) Unless the brace notation were a part of linguistic 
theory, it would have been unlikely for the phonological 
system of Old English to have changed into that of Early 
Middle English in the way that it did. 
It is clear that Kiparsky regards such a change as quite unlikely 
from his characterization of it as a "very peculiar" one. When we add 
as a minor premise a statement that such a change did in fact occur, of 
course, it follows from (1) that the brace notation is (strongly) supported 
(the more unlikely the change in question is considered, the stronger the 
support offered by the fact that it did occur), as long as we agree with 
these premises.9 
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4.1.2. Stampe on Kiparsky ' s argument. Stampe (1973:48) begins his critiqu.e 
of Kiparsky's argument by, as noted above, "granttng the beauty of this 
argument ... " I take this as implying that Stampe, at least, feels that 
the argument form employed by Kiparsky is a legitimate one (as well as a 
"beautiful" one) . This, despite the fact that Stampe does not accept 
Kiparsky's conclusion, is an indication of the strong intuitive appeal of 
the Bayesian argument schema . 
What apparently motivated Stampe to question the soundness of Kiparsky's 
argument (though, again, not the validity of the argument form) seems to 
be that it "seems odd that phonetically motivated changes of this sort, 
changes which at least in their inception were imposed on the language by 
its speaker, and not vice versa, should be subject to the sort of cognitive 
analysis implied by the brackets" (Stampe 1973:48). In terms of the 
Bayesian schema (1), even if the brace notation were psychologically real, 
changes of this type would be unlikely . lo 
Stampe goes on to present an alternative analysis of the facts of Old 
English and Early Middle English , one which would not make a change of the 
type that occurred appear unlikely, thus disputing Kiparsky's (imolicit) 
claim about the unlikelihood of this change without the psychological 
reality of braces. In so doing, however, he not only disputes the value 
of the probability that Eis true unless His true; he also calls into 
question whether or not Eis actually true. Thus, instead of Kiparsky's 
rules , Stampe (p~. 48-9) has (6) and (7) for Old English and Early Middle 
English, respectively. 
(6) V + -long/ CC . (where . is a syllable boundary) 
(7) V + -long/ C. 
That is, in Old English vowels were shortened in a syllable which was 
closed by two consonants, while at the later stage only one consonant was 
required for the shortening to take place. In favor of this formulation 
of the rules, Stampe (p . 49) adduces counterexamples to Kiparsky ' s analysis 
which are in accord with his own (OE hiehsta 'highest', EME respondent, 
where the~ and~ are syllabified with the following syllable) . Thus 
the evidence on which Kiparsky bases his argument is not only unlikely, but 
does not occur. That is, the psychologically real grammar of Old English 
contained neither the collapsed rule 5 nor the two separate rules S' and 
5 1 ', and similarly for that of Early Middle English. 
It is worth pointing out that the evidence in this case is not unambi-
guous observational data, 11 but linguistic analyses which may or may not 
be correct . It should not be surprising, then, if one investigator finds 
that he disagrees with another concerning whether or not the 'evidence' 
cited in an argument actually obtains. What needs to be done in a case 
like this is to find independent evidence for preferring one of the analyses 
over the other, as Stampe has done in this case by offering the counter-
examples noted above. Something analogous is true, I would maintain, in 
the case of many major premises. 
4 .1.3 . Botha on Kiparsky ' s argument . Botha (1973 : 94-111 ; 136~66) has 
also subjected Kiparsky ' s argument to some criticism, but on grounds quite 
different from those offered by Stampe. Using the framework developed in 
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Toulmin (1964), Botha "reconstructs" this argument(pp. 100-1) as in (8). 
(8) If the brace convention ... is incorporated in the general-
linguistic theory, then it follows that the linguistic changes 
c1 and c2 could have occurred as a single unitary change C. 
The linguistic changes C1 and C2 occurred as a singl e unitary 
linguistic change. 
The brace convention .•. should be incorporated in the general-
linguistic theory and should be assigned psychological 
reality. 
Botha is unhappy with this argument because (p. 101) "there is a distinct 
qualitative difference in content between the evidential statement, which 
as the minor premise refers to an historical and diachronic state of affairs 
and the second half of the conclusion, in which a claim is made about 
a nonhistorical, nondiachronic mental state of affairs". But, as noted 
in section 4.1.1, the first and second halves of the conclusion appear 
to be considered logically equivalent by Kiparsky, and therefore the seconL 
half must not be qualitatively different unless the first one is. 
There are further problems with Botha 1 s reconstruction, and I would 
like to give a brief discussion of this issue, in the course of which 
it should become clear that the entire argument as reconstructed is incoherent 
unless Kiparsky's views on psychological reality as it relates to what 
is part of the "general-linguistic theory" are accepted, and, in fact, 
it seems that any argument from external evidence (in particular, historical 
change) implies acceptance of quite similar views. 
It is somewhat difficult to interpret this reconstruction, since it 
seems paradoxical to me to speak of more than one linguistic change (he re 
"C1 and Cz") having "occurred as a single unitary change." What Botha 
may mean by this is that we can use the brace notation to formally express 
as a "single unitary linguistic change" what is actually two separate 
ones. But if this is the case, then it is not clear that even the first 
conjunct of the conclusion is qualitatively relevant to the premises: 
why should linguistic theory incorporate a device that enables us to write 
as one change what is in reality two changes? 
Let us suppose, then, tha t what Botha means here is something like 
'what otherwise would appear to be separate changes can be expressed as 
the "single unitary linguistic change" that it in fact is,' since this 
seems to be the only other al ternative for resolving the paradox. This 
appears to be what both Kiparsky and Stampe are arguing--that there is 
a single change involved, not two. 
But if we accept this, there is a problem concerning the major premise: 
why should we expect the incorporation of a purely descriptive theoretical 
device into the "general-linguistic theory" to have any inductive conse-
quences concerning possible linguistic changes? That is, if the brace 
convention is a purely descriptive device (i . e., if it does not have 
psychological reality), then the premises are not relevant at all to actual 
linguistic changes, but only to how we can describe them. Thus, in order 
to get a reasonab]e major premise, we must attribute psychological reality 
to the brace convention--we must be willing to claim that it is more than 
just a descriptive device. Since Botha's reconstruction is considerably 
changed by now, I give below in (9) a re-reconstruction on the basis of 
the preceding discussion. 
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(9) If the brace convention is psychologically real, then it 
follows that what otherwise would appear to be separate 
linguistic changesare in fact a single unitary linguistic 
change. 
What otherwise would a~pear to be separate linguistic 
changesare in fact a single unitary linguistic change . 
The brace convention is psychologically real . 
This, I feel, is somewhat closer to what Kiparsky intended, and it 
can be seen that Kiparsky's conclusion is the result of a perfectly legitimate 
(inductive) argument. (Of course, Stampe ' s counterarguments would still 
hold, since under his analysis the single change would no longer otherwise 
appear to be separate ones.) But even given this version, there is no 
provision in the reconstruction for how strongly the evidence supports 
the conclusion (recall that the argument is a nondemonstrative one, and 
therefore does not establish the conclusion) , and both Kiparsky and Stampe 
apparently feel (cf. the latter's granting of the "beauty" of Kiparsky ' s 
argument) that, if the premises are granted, the conclusion would be strongly 
supported . What is missing here is a reference to how likely it would 
be for the apparently different linguistic changes to in fact be one even 
if the brace notation did not have psychological reality , a reference 
which can be readily seen in the Bayesian schema (2) , but which would 
seem to be difficult to incorporate into any reconstruction of the type 
that Botha gives . That is, Kiparsky's argument is reconstructible much 
more appropriately in terms of a Bayesian schema than in Botha ' s terms. 
Thus, the form of Kiparsky's argument is quite legitimate, although Stampe 
has given reason to doubt the premises involved . 
4 .1 . 4. Discussion. What can be concluded from the above considerations? 
It seems to me that Kiparsky is quite correct in his contention that a 
certain aspect of linguistic theory is supported insofar as it renders 
an otherwise unlikely phenomenon comprehensible . This is just an instanti-
ation of Bayesian inference , and as such has the same formal characteristics 
as many other (non-linguistic) scientific inferences; the argument form 
is a valid one. In this particular case, unfortunately, it seems likely 
that at least one of the premises involved is not true, and so , of course , 
the conclusion is not supported by the premises . It is worth pointing 
out here that, although in this case the determination of the requir ed 
likelihoods seems relatively straightforward, such determination will 
in many cases be pretty clearly subjective ; indeed, even in this case, 
a convinced opponent of the ' reality of the syllable ' would undoubtedly 
find the issue much less straightforward than I have implied it to be . 
4 . 2 . Hooper-Harris. 
4 . 2 . 1. Hooper on vocalic alternations in Spanish . Hooper is concerned 
with certain vowel alternations found in Spanish verb forms, and how these 
alternations should be treated in a synchronic description of Spanish . 
The alternations in question are : (i) mid vowel/diphthong (cf. t[e]ndemos/ 
t[ye]nden ' we/they tend' , c[o]cemos/c[we]cen 'we/they cook ' ) ; (ii) high 
~owel/mid vowel (ped1mos/piden 'we/they ask for ' ); and (iii) high vowel/ 
mid vowel/diphthong (mintieran 'that we lie' /ment1mos/~[ye]nt en 'we/they 
lie') . Following Hudson (1974 , 1975), Hooper proposes to treat these 
alternations as "suppletive" in nature, so that the verb stem for tend, 
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for example, would be represented in the lexicon as t\:e} nd. A rule is 
then formulated which specif ies the environments in which each of the 
alternants is found. The rule which Hooper eventually settles on is given 
in (10) (Hooper's 29 p. 159). 
(10) ye/we ye/we/ [+stress] } 
e/o -+ e/o <I C i > 
-- 0{ } {<i / u > < i/u > 
What this means is that if a lexical entry contains a {ye} , then ye
e -
appears under stress, while!=_ appears elsewhere (the !l_/we alternation is 
precisely analogous in this r espect); if there is a{~} in the lexical entry,
l 
then~ ap pears if the following vowel is i and i._ appears elsewhere; and if 
we have a {;e1,:t.'c i s found under stress,-". if unstressed and an i 
follows, and i._ otherwise. ··foor:er' s his torical argument is an attempt to 
support this analysis, and thereby Hudson's "suppletive" theory of lexical 
representation on which it is based. Let us now examine this argument. 
These alternations have undergone analogical leveling in some dialects 
of Spanish, so that only the diphthong appears where formerly there was a 
mid vowel/diphthong alternation, Hoope r states. In addition, the high / mid vowel 
alternation has been leve led in favor of the hi gh variant, and the mid 
vowel has been leveled out of the three way alternations (cf. Hooper 1976 
167). Given rule (10), Hooper claims, "the leveling is accounted for by 
the mere loss of the mid vowel case in each alternation. Subsequent to 
this loss, verbs such as contar are underlying /kwent-/, verbs such as nedir 
are underlying /pid-/, and verbs such as mentir are underly ing 
/m {Y_'l} nt-/" (Hooper 1976:168). The rule given in (11) (Hooper's 44)
l 
applies to this latter class of verbs. 
(11) / [+stress] 
Thus, she concludes, "the analysis involving rule (29) [here, rule (1)], 
based on Hudson's model, gives a uniform account of all three alternation 
types." 
Hooper goes on to argue that "it is impossible to account for this 
leveling" if a diacritic analysis such as that of Harris (1969, 1974) is 
adopted. (In such an analysis, lexical representations contain a high 
vowel in cases where a high vowel appears as an alternant, and a mid vowel 
in the other case, along with a diacritic indicating that the vowel is 
subject to lowering, to diphthongization, or to both, and there are rules 
which lower high vowels to mid vowels and convert vowels under stress to 
the corresponding diphthongs if these vowels are marked with an appropriate 
diacritic.) She continues: "the diacritic representation ... implies that 
through historical simplification, the diacritic will be lost, and the 
underlying form will replace all other allomorphs." While the developments 
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in some cases are in accord with this implication, this is not the case 
with respect to the former mid vowel/diphthong alternations (where there 
are now only diphthongs), since here the underlying form contained the mid 
vowel, and not the diphthong in Harris's analysis. Hooper argues further 
(p. 169) that no other diacritic analysis can account for this leveling, 
but I will not go into detail about this part of her argument. 
Let us now attempt to reconstruct this argument in more explicit fashion. 
Given only the discussion in the next-to-last paragraph above, one might 
be tempted to reconstruct this argument as in (12). 
(12) If rule (10) (and the associated lexical representations) 
are correct, then a uniform account of the development of 
these alternation types can be given . 
A uniform account should be given (i.e., the development 
was uniform). 
Therefore rule (1) (etc.) are correct. 
It should be noted that the minor premise in this reconstructed argument 
was never explicitly stated by Hooper. However, it is clearly needed 
to arrive at even an 'inductive' argument form (cf. the discussion in 
section 4.1.3 above), and Hooper apparently regarded it as being true. 
If we examine the paragraph which follows this one, however, it 
becomes clear that the overall argument form which Hooper intends is the 
stonger Bayesian one. A revised reconstruction which takes this into 
account is given in (12 1 ). 
(12') Unless rule (10) (etc.) were correct, it would be unlikely 
that a uniform account of the development of these alter-
nation types could be given. 
A uniform account should be given . 
Therefore rule (10) (etc.) are correct . 
That is, no diacritic analysis can give a uniform account, and such an 
analysis is the only readily imaginable alternative . This, then, appears 
to be the form of Hooper's argument; and again the argument form appears 
to be a legitimate one; an assessment of the premises will be given in 
section 4 . 2.3. 
4. 2. 2. Harris' s reply . Before proceeding to Harris' s reply, let me first 
sketch briefly his (latest) analysis, since he contrasts it with that 
of Hooper with respect to predictions about historical change. He main-
tains the basic diacritic approach outlined in the previous section : some 
lexical items (those subject to diphthongization) are marked with a 
diacritic [D], while others (and some which are also marked [D]) are marked 
with the diacritic [HM] (for 'high-mid'--these lexical items are subject 
to the high/mid vowel alternations). He has two separate rules which 
correspond to Hooper's rule (10) ; these are given in (13) and (14) (Harris's 
4 and 10). 
(13) -back ][ +st~ess l + [ -syllabic I [ -high 
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(a)(14) 
+ [-high]/ [HM) Cl 
{ 
[ ~ ~~ l } 
/[X[3 CONJ]Y] b ver (b) 
[+high] 
That is, stressed~ and~ are converted to I!::. and we, respectively, in lexical 
items which are marked [DJ; and in third-conjugation verbs which are marked 
[HM], a mid vowel appears when an~ follows and a high vowel appears other-
wise. 
Let us now turn to Harris'scounter-arguments. His basic approach 
is to first question Hooper's facts (cf. Stampe's criticism of Kiparsky 
in section 4.1.2). He agrees that the mid vowel has been leveled out 
of those alternations where a high vowel is one of the alternants (i.e., 
types (ii) and (iii) described in section 4.2.1). But, he goes on (p. 
54), "in a number of dialects--overlapping, but not coextensive with those 
in which the high-mid alternation is lost--the diphthongization alternation 
has been partially lost. Here the loss is sporadic, affecting particular 
lexical items at random." The alternations have been leveled here in 
favor of the monophthong (contrary to Hooper's account), so that, e.g., 
"standard .. ,.9.!:::[ye/e]E_- 'want' has become .s..::[e]E_-." The leveling of the 
mid vowel/diphthong alternation in favor of the diphthong mentioned by 
Hooper does in fact occur in some Chicano dialects, but it is somewhat 
more complicated than Hooper's account suggests: "this particular leveling 
has occurred only in first-conjugation verbs with the [we] - [o] alternation, .. 
First conjugation verbs with the [ye] - [e] alternation, and verbs of 
the other conjugation with either alternation are not affected." 
This requires that the account of the historical changes, assuming 
Hooper's analysis, be somewhat different. In particular, Harris claims, 
"the loss of the high-mid alternation consists of three seemingly unrelated 
changes: (a) loss of mid vowels in individual lexical disjunctions, (b) 
loss of the environment of rule 17 [here, rule (10)--DGC], and (c) loss 
of the second case of rule 19. 11 12 That is, contrary to Hooper's claims, 
her analysis does not give "a uniform account of" even just the high/mid 
part of the alternations. Furthermore, Harris argues, "nothing in this 
account predicts loss of the mid vowel in all forms, rather than the high 
vowel in some and the mid in others, or the high vowel in all forms." 
Concerning the sporadic leveling of the diphthongization alternation 
mentioned above, Harris has little to say--he apparently feels that it 
is unproblematic for either his or Hooper's analysis (cf. pp. 54, 56). 
He does, however, note (p. 55) that "nothing in Hooper's account reflects 
the fact that diphthongization is lost in one particular morphological 
subclass, as described above," in the case of the leveling which affected 
only the o/we alternation in first-conjugation verbs. 
Harris also argues that on his analysis, "loss of this alternation 
implies loss of all and only the machinery associated with just this alter-
nation, namely rules 1413 and 10a [here (14a)] and, obviously, the trigger-
ing feature [HM]. Nothing else changes. In particular, rule 10b [i.e., 
(14b)] remains in effect, guaranteeing that the only possible result of 
the loss of the alternation is precisely the survival of high vowels" 
(pp. 53-54). In the case of the sporadic leveling of diphthongization, 
"all that changes is that individual lexical items lose their exceptional 
diphthongizaton-marking property ... This behavior in exceptional forms 
- 26 -
is unremarkable" (p . 54) . As for the levelings in favor of the diphthongs, 
Harris claims (p. 54) that "this means that , in addition to the general 
process of diphthongization (which remains unaltered), the granunar of 
these innovative dialects must contain a special statement referring to 
the absence of first-conjugation stems with the 'back' branch of diphthongi-
zation" (he refers the reader in a footnote to Harris (1974) for a 
formulation of such a "special statement"). 
Harris goes on to present some data not discussed by Hooper . Some 
speakers of the Chicano dialects just referred to, presumably due to influ-
ence from the mass media , schooling, and recent immigrants who speak more 
standard varieties of Spanish, have apparently reestablished the high/mid 
vowel alternation in a systematically characterizable way: "all diph-
thongizing third-conjugation verbs have high and mid stem-vowel variants; 
no non-diphthongizing verb does" (p. 56). That is, assuming that these 
dialects are more innovative than the other Chicano dialects which have 
leveled out the mid vowel variant completely, the only verbs which have 
reestablished the high/mid alternation are those third-conjugation verbs 
which in Harris's analysis were previously (and still are) marked with 
the diacritic [D] . Such facts, Harris maintains (p, 56), "are beyond 
the reach of Hooper's analysis, which treats all of the innovations in 
question as collections of accidents, rather than systematic changes." 
Let us now summarize Harris's counter-arguments, and cast them in 
a more explicit reconstructed form. First of all , he claims that Hooper's 
analysis does not offer a unifonn account of the historical changes with 
respect to the high-mid alternations, (i .e., that the major premises in 
(12) and (12') are false) and that (assuming that "all and only the machinery 
associated with just this alternation"--see above--is meant to be roughly 
equivalent to "uniform") his analysis does. This appears straightforward, 
and I will not attempt to explicate it further . His second point is that 
Hooper's analysis does not predict loss of the mid vowel in the high/mid 
alternations, while his does. This argument, as it stands, is of the 
form given in (15).14 
(15) Analysis A1 makes prediction P. 
Analysis A2 does not make prediction P. 
Pis found to be true. 
Therefore, A1 is to be preferred to A2. 
It is 
takes 
of 
on 
some interest to note that this argument, if strengthened somewhat, 
a Bayesian appearance. Such a strengthened version is given 
in (15'). 
(15') Unless Harris's analysis (A ) were correct, the facts P1
would be unlikely . 
Pis true. 
Therefore,A is likely to be correct.1 
Harris apparently does not want to make this stronger claim, however, 
presumably preferring simply to establish the superiority of his analysis 
over Hooper's. It should be noted that in so doing Harris is making no 
claims as to the ultimate correctness of his analysis, but only that it 
is to be preferred to that of Hooper. His final argument appears to be 
that his analysis allows one to specify which verbs reintroduce the high/ 
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mid alternation, while Hooper's does not. This argument form is suffici-
ently similar to that in (15) that I see no need to reconstruct it here 
(but note that "prediction" will have to be replaced by something like 
"generalization).15 
4.3.2. Discussion, As noted above, Harris has called into question the 
accuracy of the data on which Hooper bases her argument. That is·, the 
"development of these alternation types" referred to in (12) and (12') 
above does not correspond to their actual historical development. If 
the facts are indeed as Harris and his sources (which are the same, for 
the most part, as those of Hooper) describe them, then Hooper I s argumen_t 
is incoherent, since an implicit part of the major premise is not true, 
Even if the facts were exactly as Hooper has described them, however, 
there appears to be a problem for her, since Hudson's suppletion theory 
"proposes that the direction of leveling is always toward the form designated 
as the elsewhere case [i.e., the one without a conditioning environment--
DGC] of the distribution rule ... " (Hooper (1976:129)), This is not, 
on her account, what has happened in the diphthongization case--the levelin 
has been toward the diphthong, which is not the elsewhere case in any 
expansion of the "distribution rule" (lOr:- Thus, either this case (and 
the similar case of the leveling out of the mid vowel in the three-way 
alternations) is a counterexample to this proposal and it must be modified, 
or the suppletion theory of lexical representations has been falisifed. 
Note also that attempting to revise the suppletion analysis somewhat so 
as to make the diphthongs the elsewhere case would result in incorrect 
predictions concerning the sporadic leveling of the diphthongization alterna-
tions, where the diphthongs are leveled out and mid vowels remain. In 
ay event, the fact that the diphthongization alternation levels out in 
different dialects in different directions indicates that the suppletion 
theory (or any other theory, undoubtedly) must give up its claims for 
predictive power concering the direction of leveling. 16 
Let us turn now to Harris's arguments. First of all, does Hooper's 
analysis in fact make the loss of the high/mid alternation appear to consist 
of "three seemingly unrelated changes"? It seems to me.that it' does not; 
once the mid vowel in each "individual lexical disjunction" has been lost 
in the high/mid cases, the other changes follow automatically. That is, 
the fact that the environment of the second part of rule·(lO) is missing 
is an automatic consequence of the lack of lexical items containing both 
a mid and a high vowel in the braces of a suppletive lexical representation; 
there could never be an opportunity for this environment to be met, and 
so it is not needed. Similarly, the loss of the second part of Harris's 
rule 19 (see note 12) is the automatic consequence of there no longer 
being any mid vowels in the lexical representations of third-conjugation 
verbs. These changes do not appear to me to be at all unrelated. Moreover, 
Harriss's analysis seems to be saying pretty much the same thing as Hooper's: 
once the "triggering feature (HM]" is lost, there is nothing for rule 
(5a) (his 10a) to apply to, Harris is not quite correct that his rule 14 
has been lost, however. In actuality, it must have changed to something 
like (16). 
(16) If [ 3 ~onj ] , then t!X [ +s~ll ] C If+high 0 
That is, all diphthongizing third-conjugation verbs have a high vowel. 
Concomitantly, Harriss's rule 13 (p. 46), given below in (17), must be 
modified to something like (18). 
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+syll ]
(17) If [D), then -high[ -low 
+syll ]
(18) If [ +l ~onj ] , then -high
[ -low 
That is, it is no longer true that all diphthongizing verbs have mid vowels--
now, only first-conjugation verbs do . These changes again appear to be 
necessary consequences of the across-the-board loss of the diacritic [HM). 
I can see little difference between the two analyses in this respect. 
It should be pointed out, however, that Hooper's analysis contains no 
analog of rule (17), and , it appears to me , it would not be at all easy 
to formulate a redundancy statement of the form which Hooper employs to 
express this fact. That is, it is apparently very difficult, if not impos-
sible, to express in the notation used by Hooper the fact that whenever 
there is an alternation involving a diphthong in standard Spanish, there 
is also a mid vowel involved . (This is related only somewhat marginally 
to the arguments from historical change, but since rule (17) must be replaced 
by rule (18) for Harris, it cannot be completely ignored.) Thus, in sum, 
Harris ' s claim that Hooper's analysis does not provide a uniform account 
of the high/mid vowel alternations appears to be false. 
The second issue to be discussed in this context is whether or not 
Hooper ' s analysis predicts the direction of leveling in the high/mid alterna-
tions. If we accept the principle that leveling favors the elsewhere 
variant (this principle has of course been shown above to be very difficult 
to maintain, however), then it seems clear that it does, since the high 
vowel is the elsewhere variant and it is the one that ' wins out ' in the 
leveling . The fact that the principle which makes the prediction is probably 
incorrect should not be regarded too highly, by the way, since the corres-
ponding principle for the diacritic analysis (that the underlying form 
shows up in cases of leveling) also appears to be incorrect in view of 
the data under discussion, since there are dialects which level out the 
diphthongization alternation in favor of the diphthong instead of the 
underlying monophthong . Thus, the second premise in (15) appears not 
to be true. 
As for Harris ' s third argument, it is not at all clear to me that 
it is in fact the case that there is no way to specify which verbs reintroduce 
the high/mid alternation. In particular, just as Harris can state that 
precisely those third- conjugation verbs which are marked [D) reintroduce 
thealternation, it seems that Hooper can just as easily state that all 
third-conjugation verbs which contain a stem 'vowel' roughly of the form 
diphthong } . d t h. ternation· . A · he prem1Se· t h{ . h reintro uce is a1 gain, t a t h1g vowe1 
Hooper ' s analysis cannot state this generalization appears to be false . 
To sum up , when the data have been straightened out and the premises 
of the arguments are examined with these data in mind, the historical 
changes which have affected Spanish vowel alternations appear to shed 
little light concerning a choice between a Hooper-type suppletion analysis 
and a Harrisiandiacritic analysis . Some general implications of these 
data in particular will be discussed below (see section 5 . ) 
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4 . 3. Schuh-Leben 17
4 . 3.1. Schuh on 'rule inversion in Chadic ' . Schuh first presents data 
which indicate that in the Chadic language Kanakuru earlier stops "weakened 
to corresponding sonorants in phonologically specifiable environments," so 
that ,'<!., i<i, 1<{ became ~, >'<l and ,'<_g_ became 1_, and *.I?. and *~ and *f became 
w. These weakenings resulted in many cases in synchronic alternations 
between stops and sonorants (e.g., yilik 'tongue' vs. yiliy-no 'my tongue'). 
But the synchronic rule, Schuh maintains, does not mirror the diachronic 
change; rather, "the rules producing the alternations ... are 'hardening ' 
rules and the sonorant variants are underlying" (p . 384). 
In support of his contention about the rule having been inverted, Schuh 
offers three arguments: (a) in synchronic alternations, the sonorants 
currently alternate only with voiceless stops, regardless of their etymo-
logical source, and, furthermore, the sonorant/voiceless stop alternation 
has been extended even to etymological sonorants: (b) it would otherwise 
be impossible to distinguish stop-sonorant sequences which are subject to 
a rule of schwa-epenthesis from those which are not--only underlying stops 
(in Schuh ' s analysis) trigger epenthesis: and (c) plurals of certain nouns 
and verbs, which formerly contained various (etymological) stops, have been 
regularized so that they contain only .I?.,!._ and l (the singulars contain 
the corresponding sonorants); also, some singulars have alternate forms 
for the plural, one showing "hardening" and the other the sonorant found 
in the singular (cf. Schuh 1972 : 286-9). 
Let us now attempt to reconstruct these arguments in more explicit 
fashion. Schuh's actual wording of argument (a) (p . 386) is repeated below 
in (19). The argument, in somewhat more explicit terms, can ,thus apparently 
be taken to be representable as in (20). 
(19) . .. regarding the contemporary Kanakuru consonant alterna-
tions as an inverse rule where sonorant ~ stop rather than 
the historical process stop~ sonorant exolains the 
regularization of the alternations giving only voiceless 
stops as alternates of sonorants. It also explains why 
etymological sonorants now alternate with stops . 
(20) If the alternations are regarded as being due to an 
inverse rule, then the regularizations are explained. 
Therefore, the alternations are due to an inverse rule . 
As stated, there appears to be something missing in this argument. For 
one thing, it seems clear that merely regarding the alternations as being 
due to an inverse rule cannot possibly play a part in an explanation of the 
regularizations (or anything else, for that matter)--these alternations 
must in fact be due to an inverse rule. It therefore seems desirable to 
amend the premise in (20) so as to delete the "regarded as being" part. 
I am reasonably confident that Schuh would have no objection to such an 
amendment; he was, after all, arguing that the rule inversion analysis is 
correct . The second thing which appears to be missing from this argument 
is a minor premise. Since it is easy to add a premise which would probably 
seem obvious to all linguists, and which would make the argument have roughly 
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the form of the inductive arguments discussed by Botha, it appears reason-
able to add such a premise; the revised form of (20), including the 
revision in the major premise, is therefore given as (20'). 
(20') If the alternations are due to an inverse rule, then 
the regularizations are explained. 
The regularizations should (must) be explained . 
Therefore, the alternations are due to an inverse rule. 
Since the argument as given in (20') is inductive in form, it is 
subject to all the weaknesses of such argument types. In particular, it 
is quite possible that something other than the rule's being inverted could 
explain the regularizations. It is therefore possible that Schuh intended 
his argument to have a stronger Bayesian form, although it is difficult 
to tell since there are no connectives in Schuh's actual argument (I 
supplied the if in the reconstructions). To allow for this possibility, 
I give a Bayesian version of (20') in (21). 
(21) Unless the alternations were due to an inverse rule , it 
is unlikely that the regularizations could be 
explained . 
The regularizations should (must) be explained. 
Therefore, it is likely that the alternations are due 
to an inverse rule . 
Let us turn now to Schuh's second argument. He presents (p. 386) the 
data given in (22) . 
(22) a. a wupa-ro 'he sold (it) to her' [cf. wupe 'to sell'] 
b. a gup-ro di)'ii 'he forged a [cf. guwi 'to forge'] 
hoe for her' 
V 
c . si kuke-mai 'he is learning it' [cf. kuke 'to learn'], 
d . si dur)-r)ai 'he is beating it' [cf. duyi 'to beat'] 
[cf. also a duk-ro 'he beat (it) for her'] 
Schuh argues (pp. 386-7) that "if we were to take stops as underlying in 
all cases and derive the sonorants from them, there would be no way to 
distinguish the medial consonant in the verb root in [22a] from that in [22b] 
and the medial consonant in the verb root in {22c] from that in [22d] for 
the purposes of epenthetic ~ insertion . . . Likewise, by not distinguishing 
k and y_ underlyingly, we would have no way to predict which words have velars 
which assimilate to a following nasal, as in [22d)." What Schuh apparently 
means by this is that the underlying form of the verb stem for the above 
forms is the same as the surface form of the infinitive; after a rule which 
deletes final -i in verbs everywhere except pre-pausally has applied, the 
epenthesi18rule-mentioned earlier applies, breaking up stop-sonorant clusters, and then a rule which assimilates velars to a following nasal 
and the inverted version of weakening (which applies in the complement of 
the former weakening environments) apply to produce the stops in the left 
column of (22) . Sample derivations for (22a, b) are given in (23). This 
argument thus seems to be reconstructible in the modus tollens form given 
in (24). 
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(23) /wupe-ro/ /guwi-ro/ 
i-deletion guw -ro 
epenthesis wupe-rol8 
(assimilation) 
strengthening gup -ro 
(24) If stops are underlying in all cases, there is no way to 
distinguish the required consonants with respect to 
epenthesis. 
These consonants should (must) be distinguished. 
Therefore, stops cannot be underlying in all cases. 
The minor premise here is again only implicit in Schuh's actual words, 
but is so innocuous looking that it can reasonably be supplied here. 
Let us now proceed to Schuh's third argument. As noted earlier, it 
has two parts: "first, the stops found in the plural [which have not 
undergone weakening] do not always reflect their etymologies .... In fact, 
the alternations are always w/p, r/ct and 'f/k" (pp. 388-9), with the excepti u 
of the verb 'to die', where .E. alternates with_£. Secondly, "plural hardeni110 
... involves an alternation which is both phonetically unmotivated and 
requires arbitrary marking of those lexical items which undergo it," which 
leads it to be replaced by "more regular processes which do the same semantic 
or syntactic work" (p. 389). In this case, the sonorants show up in the 
plural. Examples given by Schuh to support these claims include those 
in (25) (cf. pp. 387, 389--~gin is the most common and productive plural 
suffix). --
(25) 'hen' yaawe (sg,) yaapiyen/yaawiQgin (pl.) (cf. Tangale _·ahe) 
'gazelle' sere (sg.) sediyen/sereQgin (pl.) (c£. Dira kite) 
It is not clear exactly what form these arguments should take here, since ull 
Schuh does is mention the facts. It seems, however, that he intends something 
like (26), in which the arguments, of course, take a Bayesian form. 
(26) a. Unless the rule has been inverted, it would be unlikely 
that the (non-weakened) stops in the plurals would 
not reflect their etymologies and rather have a single 
stop for any sonorant in the singulars. 
They do not reflect their etymologies, etc . 
Therefore, it is likely that the rule has been inverted. 
b. Unless the rule has been inverted, it would be unlikely 
that the plural rules would be replaced by a more regular 
process in which the singular sonorant shows up in 
the plural. 
These rules have been so replaced, 
Therefore, it is likely that the rule has been inverted. 
There is some evidence in Schuh's comment on Leben's reply that he did 
in fact intend a Bayesian argument at least for (26a), in that he argues 
(p. 289) that having an underlying stop and a rule of weakening in singulars 
"totally ducks the issue of why the stops in the plural have all been 
neutralized, and moreover why even historical sonorants now alternate with 
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stops ..• " That is, unless there had been an inversion, such changes would 
have been unlikely . 
Schuh gives one final argument concerning historical change, this 
time in Hausa, another Charlie language . He first argues for a series 
of changes often referred to as 'Klingenheben 's Law ' (since these changes 
were first systematically described in Klingenheben 1928) on the basis 
of "synchronic alternates , dialect variants , and comparative evidence" 
(p . 391), whereby original velar stops became w, alveolar obs truents became 
!_, and labial stops, including etymological m,-became w, all syllable-
finally ; there is again little question about whether this is an accurate 
description of the history of Hausa. 
Schuh then proceeds to argue that this process has taken an inverted 
form from a synchronic perspective. One bit of evidence for inversion , 
Schuh argues, has to do with the formation of plurals. "The language 
is losing those plural forms where obstruents alternate with sonorants" 
(p. 393). The innovative plurals contain the sonorant which is found 
in the singular. Thus we find forms such as those in (27) , 19 where the 
singular~ is the result of Klingenheben's Law, and the original plural 
is formed by infixing -aa- and adding a suffixal - ee or - aa to the noun 
stem (~ becomes £ ([cl) and ~ becomes i ([j]) beforefront-;owels by a 
general process of the language) . 
(27) Singular Plural 
' buffalo ' bawnaa bakaanee/bawnaayee 
'heart' zuwciyaa zukataa/zuwciyooyii 
'Tuareg' buwzuu bugajee/buwzaayee 
Moreover, Schuh continues (p. 394), there is further evidence "in the 
word gwauroo ' bachelor' which has the plural alternates gwauraayee and 
gwagwaaree . This second alternate has to be an analogical reformation 
resulting from the neutralization of >'<P and >'<K in syllable final position . 
The -~- in gwauroo comes from '~.!'.., not *_g_, as can be seen in the dialect 
variants gwabroo or gwamroo" . Schuh again is not very specific about 
the actual form of his argument, presumably feeling that it should be 
clear from the form of his previous arguments. However, given the consi-
derable lack of clarity concerning the precise form of his previous argu-
ments , it is not at all clear whether this one should be reconstructed 
in an inductive, Bayesian, or modus tollens form, although it seems safe 
to assume that it is meant to be of one of these types. I give a Bayesian 
version in (28), mainly because , as will be seen in the next section, 
Leben appears to be construing it in this way . 
(28) Unless Klingenheben ' s Law has been inverted , it would be 
unlikely that the regularization of plurals and the 
analogical reformation of the plural of gwawroo would occur. 
They do occur . 
Therefore , it is likely that Klingenheben ' s Law has been 
inverted . 
4. 3. 2 . Leben' s reply. Leben argues (p . 265) that "Schuh' s evidence does 
not lead to the intended cone lusion." He goes on (pp . 265-6) to claim 
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that "the positing of a synchronic stage with . .. inverse rules constitutes 
a middleman which it would be advantageous to eliminate in principle from 
the realm of possible phonological systems" . In order to show that it 
is possible to eliminate inverse rules, of course , Leben must counter 
each of Schuh's arguments, and he proceeds to attempt to do so. 
Concerning Schuh ' s first argument, Leben argues (p . 267) that "if 
we do not assume that sonorants became basic , it is still possible to 
explain the historical developments . " Recall that what is to be explained 
is the fact that sonorants now alternate only with voiceless stops. Leben 
proposes an alternative explanation for this : "In the examples given 
by Schuh, the voiceless stops resulting from this regularization appeared 
in a typical devoicing environment, immediately preceding a voiceless 
stop . . . • I f , in addition, etymological i, Q_, etc . , ceased to surface phone-
tically as voiced stops, then future generations would be presented with 
no synchronic evidence for setting up underlying voiced stops in these 
words . " Thus, the voiceless stops could become underlying for this reason 
in the case of etymological stops . As for the historical sonorants which 
now alternate with stops, Leben notes (p. 268) that "the only instances 
he cites of the extension of the alternation to historical sonorants occur 
in word final position, and Schuh himself notes (p . 386) that 'word final 
is a position of neutralization where stops and sonorants cannot contrast 
either phonetically or underlying [sic).'" The sonorants have been eliminated 
by this neutralization rule in favor of voiceless stops , which "will naturally 
be subject to the same alternations as any other instance" of voiceless 
stops. What Leben has done, then, is to argue that there is another possible 
explanation of the regularizations, i.e . , that the if-clause in (20 ' ) 
can be replaced by something else (which would makethis inductive argument 
unconvincing) or the major premise in (21) is false. 
Similarly, Leben argues (p . 270) that it is possible to account for 
the varying susceptibility of stop-sonorant clusters to epenthesis without 
an inverse rule . In particular, he makes use of the same rules as those 
mentioned in connection with Schuh ' s argument , except that a rule of weaken-
ing, which mirrors the historical process , replaces Schuh's strengthening . 
This process , it should be noted, did not affect stops which were preceded 
by a short vowel and followed by e, or stops which were followed by a. 
These rules result in derivations such as those in (29) . 
(29) /wupe- ro/ /gupi-ro/ 
i-deletion and epenthesis wupa-ro gup -ro 
(assimilation) 
weakening 
The isolation form of /gupi/ weakens to guwi , but that of wupe (as in 
all other forms with stops between a short vowel and e) does not. This 
completes Leben ' s argument that the major premise in (24) is false. 
Leben does not have much to say about Schuh's third argument, apparently 
feeling that inverted rules which apply only "in a small subset of nouns 
and in a small class of verbs that form plural stems" (p . 270) need not 
be eliminated from the class of possible rules. He does note, however, 
that be sees "no good reason for assuming that [the process at issue) 
did involve Weakening in singulars , " and argues that "even if it were 
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shown that this morphological rule had become inverted, the case for Schuh's 
other inverse rules would not become any more plausible . For one thing , 
this morphological rule converts r into d.', and thus it does not reinforce 
Schuh's earlier proposal of a rule to convert r into t." It thus appears 
that Leben is willing to concede that this could be a-case of rule inversion, 
but argues that since the inversion has happened to a morphological rule, 
it is not of the same type as Schuh ' s earlier examples, which presumably 
involved phonological rules , and therefore is irrelevant to establishing 
whether or not it is possible for the latter type of rule to become inverted. 
Concerning the Hausa example, Leben first argues (p . 274) that Schuh's 
"proposed solution seems unnecessary, since the regularized plurals are 
functioning to reduce allomorphy in the singular-plural paradigm." He 
goes on to point out that "there are perhaps over a dozen different ways 
of forming plurals in Hausa; a noun may take a number of different plurals, 
all with the same meaning. A given noun or adjective must be marked for 
which way or ways its plural is formed" . Then he argues that "looking 
at the correspondence between the singular and the old plural and comparing 
this to the correspondence established with the regularized plural, it 
is hardly surprising that the regularized plurals should be gaining ground, 
to the detriment of the older forms." That is, he is apparently questioning 
the major premise in (28) . 
He goes on (p . 275) to "examine the question of whether rule inversion 
was even possible in the cases proposed by Schuh." His position is that 
it was not, since having a stage in the history of Hausa with inverse 
rules "entails eliminating an otherwise valid constraint on plural formation" 
(that stems which end in a consonant cluster have -aa- inserted between 
these consonants, while stems with a final glide-consonant sequence have 
-aa- inserted after the consonant in the formation of plurals) at this 
stage, while (p. 276) once this stage "began to be overcome by the regular-
ization of the plural forms ..• , Hausa went back to the old restriction 
on -aa- Insertion . . . " "This scenario, 11 says Leben (p. 277), " . .. is totally 
unacceptable." Moreover (p . 276), "the putative relaxation did not have 
any effect on the derivation of plurals that had pre-existing stems ending 
in a glide-consonant sequence" (that is, they continue to form their plurals 
by inserting the -aa- after the stem final consonant) . This argument 
thus appears to beof a modus tollens type, as indicated in (30). 
(30) If Klingenheben's Law has been inverted, then the 
restriction on -aa- insertion was eliminated and then re-
introduced, and the elimination of this constraint had 
no effect on pre-existing stems endings in glide-consonant. 
This did not happen (i.e. , "is totally unacceptable"). 
Therefore, Klingenheben's Law has not been inverted. 
Leben goes on to propose his own analysis of the development of Hausa 
plurals,20 one which does not require an inverted rule, but rather makes 
use of "competing underlying forms" (p. 277). This proposal entails, 
for example, that "the existence of the covariants bakaanee and bawnaayee in 
Hausa simply constitutes evidence for two competing underlying forms 
/bakn-/ and /6awn-/ . " Thus, there is an analysis other than Schuh's which 
is compatible with the regularizations observed to have occurred; i.e., 
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Leben claims that the major premise of (28) is false. Finally, Leben 
suggests that his analysis, but not Schuh' s, gives a possible explanation 
of why farkee 'trader' has only fataakee as a plural, and has not regular-
ized . It has to do with the existence of "the derived form fatawcii 
'trading' (derived by an unproductive process), where w comes from kin 
/fatk-/ by Klingenhebe11 's Law. Therefore, restructuring of /fatk-T as /fark-/, 
though it would succeed in reducing allomorphy in the singular-plural para-
digm, would at the same time obscure the relationship of fatawcii to its root" 
(p. 278), \.;rhile there is no corresponding form in the cases which are under-
going regularization. This appears to be a rather minor point in Leben's 
discussion, and so I will not attempt to make the argument form more explicit . 
4.3.3. Discussion. Concerning the regularizations of the alternations 
in Kanakuru so that there is only a voiceless stop which, regardless of 
its etymological source, alternates with the sonorants which are the result 
of the historical weakening process (as well as etymological sonorants), 
there can be little question that Leben's account is superficially at least 
as plausible as that of Schuh. Schuh is apparently in agreement with 
this assessment, since he states in his comment on Leben's reply (p . 279) 
that "Leben has registered a number of valid criticisms of my analyses ... ," 
and does not explicitly comment on the issue in question. Thus, Leben 
has apparently succeeded in showing, at least to Schuh's satisfaction, 
that the if-clause in (20') is not the only possible means of providing 
an explanation for the regularizations, or, alternatively, that the major 
premise in (21) is false. It is possible, of course, that there could 
be data from Kanakuru which would be counterexamples to Leben's analysis--
there could be nonetymological voiceless stops which alternate with sonorants, 
and which are not in a devoicing environment, or there could be etymologic~l 
sonorants which alternate with voiceless stops which are in other than 
word-final position. Schuh is apparently not aware of any evidence of 
the type just mentioned, since he does not bring it up in his comment, 
but this is clearly an empirical question. It should be noted in this 
regard that if there are in fact no data of this kind, Leben's account 
would appear to be supported, since the lack of stops occurring in other 
kinds of environments would appear a priori to be quite unlikely, unless 
perhaps some facts about the structure of Kanakuru preclude such data. 
However, such data clearly do exist, even among the examples discussed 
by Leben, although he is correct in his statement that the examples cited 
by Schuh in his first argument contain no data of this type , Thus, we 
find guwi and a gup-ro diyii illustrating Lhe ~/}!_ alternation (cf. Schuh, 
p. 385 and Leben, p. 268), where}!_ is clearly neither in a devoicing environ-
ment nor in word-final position. Thus, since the alternating consonants 
come from etymological >',f> (cf. Schuh, p . 385), Leben' s analysis cannot 
be maintained . He thus has shown neither that there is an alternative 
explanaticn for Schuh's facts nor, alternatively, that the major premise 
of (21) is false (i.e . , he has not explained the disappearance of other 
stops from the stop-sonorant alternations). 
The question of epenthesis is likewise in principle an empirical one, 
since Schuh's and Leben's analyses, though both generate the forms discussed 
by Schuh, make different predictions about the behavior of other possible 
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forms. Leben's analysis essentially claims that all verbs with stem-
final -e or with a final consonant exhibit 'epenthesis,' while Schuh 's 
predicts that verbs with etymological sonorants (which now alternate with 
stops due to the analogical leveling mentioned by Schuh) will not. That 
is, it is possible that, in addition to verbs with non-alternating stops 
(presumably (22a) is an example of this type) due to the inhibiting effect 
of the preceding short vowel and the following -e, there are verbs with 
etymological sonorants which alternate with stops. Leben's analysis predicts 
'epenthesis', since thee would be between a stop and a sonorant at the 
point in the derivation at which this rule is applicable, but Schuh's 
analysis predicts none since what is an underlying stop for Leben is an 
underlying sonorant for Schuh in such cases. The two analyses also make 
different predictions concerning the behavior of verb stems in final 
-e, but with a long vowel preceding the pre -e consonant . These consi-
derations show that there are potential differences between the two analyses 
even at the level of observational adequacy (one of them must generate 
incorrect surface forms), although both offer an account of the data at 
hand, with respect to the epenthesis facts. Choosing between the two 
analyses thus depends solely (or at least primarily) on synchronic data, 
and not on historical evidence in this case; both appear to be somewhat 
satisfactory accounts of the historical data presented by Schuh in his 
first two arguments. 
Concerning the question of which account of epenthesis is in accord 
with the synchronic facts of Kanakuru, Newman (1974) gives some discussion 
which indicates that the facts are closer to being the way Schuh has described 
them, rather than as in Leben's analysis. First of all, it should be 
noted, the schwa-epenthesis rule is actually somewhat different than in 
either Schuh's or Leben's formulation--sequences of two consonants are 
subject to epenthesis if the first is voiceless or prenasalized, and the 
second may be any consonant, not just a sonorant as stated by Schuh. The 
sequence cfr is also subject to epenthesis, as are all triconsonantal clusters 
(cf. p. 3~ The exact statement of the epenthesis rule is not crucial 
to the present concern, however, and I will not pursue this matter further 
here. What seems most relevant in this respect is that Newman specifically 
states (p. 4) that "the invariant voiceless stops [i.e., those never in 
a weakening environment] .••are ... subject to [epenthetic schwa insertion], 
while the still unspecified archiphonemes are not." (Archiphonemes are 
used by Newman to represent the alternating consonants.) Thus, etymological 
sonorants (archiphonemes for Newman) which alternate with voiceless stops 
will not exhibit epenthesis even in words with final -e, contrary to Leben's 
analysis, but in accord with that of Schuh. Moreover,-data presented 
elsewhere by Newman indicate that this is in fact the case, e.g., ad owe 
'he tied it' (where thew is presumably an etymological w, since it is 
in an environment which prevented weakening). but a Qop-taru21 'he (went 
and) tied it' (p. 9). Thus, Leben's account apparently cannot be maintained 
in this case, either. 
As forSchuh's third argument (that concerning "plural hardening"), 
of course, Leben offers little objection to Schuh's analysis, and there 
is therefore not much to be said about it. The little that he does have 
to say (p . 270)--that he sees "little reason for assuming that [plural 
hardening] did involve Weakening in the singulars"--seems to be clearly 
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off the mark, since as Schuh (1974:280) points out, he did supply "cognate 
items from other languages" which suggest that there was indeed weakening 
in the singulars . Of course, Leben is not terribly concerned with this issue, 
since he apparently feels that inverted morphological rules are not of the 
type "which it would be advantageous to eliminate in principle from the realm 
of possible" (pp. 265-6) granunars of natural languages. And Schuh states 
(correctly, it seems to me) that Leben "is correct in noting that the plural 
rules ... do not make rule inversion more plausible for the cases discussed 
earlier in the article ..• " (p. 290). 
There is considerably more which can be said about the Hausa argument. 
First of all, it does indeed appear to me, at least, that "it is hardly surprising 
that the regularized plurals should be gaining ground," given the previous 
state of affairs which Leben describes. Thus, Schuh's major premise in (28) 
seems to be false. (This argument would not be any more successful if it 
had been reconstructed in one of the other forms, of course.) 
On the other hand, Leben's contention that there could not be any inver-
sion in the Hausa case seems to be on much less firm ground, and, of course, 
merely showing that the major premise in (28) is not true does not suffice 
to show that Schuh's analysis is incorrect . It is therefore of some interest 
to pursue this issue further, especially since, judging from Leben (1979), 
he feels that he has successfully shown that Schuh ' s analysis is an impossible 
one . Recall that Leben's claim concerning this issue is essentially that 
Schuh ' s analysis entails the loss of the condition of -aa·insertion at one 
stage in the history of Hausa and its reintroduction at a later stage . The 
question now is whether this sequence of events is really as unbelievable 
as Leben claims it is. On first glance, it does indeed seem that the reintro-
duction of a constraint of precisely the same form as one which has recently 
been lost from the language would be an extremely unlikely event. But if 
we look more closely at Schuh's account, it can be seen that this account 
appears to give an automatic explanation for the sequence of events in 
question . 
Let us assume, then, following Schuh, that Klingenheben's Law has been 
inverted and that underlying forms have been appropriately restructured. Thus, 
the underlying form of the stem for bawnaa, for example, is /€awn-/ . At the 
first stage of rule inversion, where the plural is still bakaanee, there must 
be a relaxation of the constraint on -aa- insertion, since it now must break 
up the glide-consonant sequence w-n, whereas before only consonant-consonant 
sequences could be broken up in this way. The derivation of 6akaanee would 
thus include something like 6awn- ~ Gaw-aa-n- ~ bak-aa-n-, where the last 
change is the result of the inverse rules, at this stage . Leben's first question 
(p. 276) is why "the putative relaxation of the condition•.• did not have any 
effect on the derivation of plurals that had pre-existing stems ending in 
a glide-consonant sequence." That is, such forms continue to show -aa- after 
the stem-final glide-consonant sequence. The answer to this question seems 
to be simply that allowing -aa- to break up the glide-consonant sequences 
in such cases would result inan incorrect plural form; if the language learner 
is to have 'correct' plural forms, he must learn which glide-consonant 
sequences are broken up by -aa- and which add it after the final consonant, 
and those which fall into thelatter category are of course precisely those 
which "had pre-existing stems ending in a glide-consonant sequence." Moreover , 
if a language learner were to 'make a mistake' in the direction of allowing 
older glide-consonant sequences to be broken up, the result would be an increase 
in allomorphy, since the glide would thereby be put in an environment which 
- 38 -
triggers the inverse rules. Since, as Leben would apparently agree (p . 274), 
we expect changes of this type to reduce allomorphy, it seems not at all 
surprising that the older forms should retain the allomorphy-minimizing 
manner of -aa- insertion. 
Can there be an equally plausible explanation for the reintroduction 
of the constraint on -aa- insertion? (This constraint would now be operative 
only in the speech of those who had completely regularized the plural system.) 
It seems to me that this reintroduction, given Schuh's analysis, is the 
straightforward consequence of the complete regularization of plural forma-
tion (note that the constraint cannot be operative in the speech of those 
who retain the older plurals for some of the singulars which were affected 
by Klingenheben's Law), which, as noted above, has a clear motivation--
the reduction of allomorphy. That is, the result of the complete elimination 
of this type of allomorphy is that there happen to be no longer any cases 
where -aa- breaks up a glide-consonant sequence. Thus, the "generalization 
about -aa- insertion" was not, as Leben puts it (p. 277), "rediscovered," 
but simply reintroduced by a perfectly natural historical process, the 
reduction of allomorphy in the singular-plural paradigm. These considera-
tions constitute essentially an argument to the effect that the minor premise 
in (30) is false. 22 
Since, as noted above, Leben has given an alternative analysis which 
does not make the regularizations in question appear unlikely,23 it seems 
that in this case, as in the Spanish case, the data from historical change 
have little to say about the form of the synchronic grammar of the language 
in question before the changes. It is perhaps worth noting, however, 
that Leben and Schuh agree that the grammar of Hausa does not contain under-
lying forms which were exactly like those in the grannnar before Klingenheben's 
Law took place; at least one positive conclusion about the form of the 
grarrunar of Hausa with respect to the underlying forms contained there, 
that not all of them are the same as before the changes occurred, can thus 
apparently be made. 
4.4. Skousen-Kiparsky . 
4.4.1. Skousen on Finnish . Skousen's basic point is that many of the 
phonological rules which have been posited by generative phonologists to 
account for morphological alternations in Finnish are not part of a descrip-
tively adequate grammar of Finnish; many of his arguments in support of 
this position invoke data from historical change, and it is these arguments 
which will be examined here. I will focus on Skousen 1972 , since Kiparsky's 
reply is directed solely toward this work (he apparently did not have access 
to Skousen's 1972 dissertation, on which Skousen 1975 is based, when 
he wrote his reply), although reference will also be made to Skousen 1975 
when it can be of help in clarifying the issues involved. 
Before giving the arguments against the validity of the rules mentioned 
above, Skousen gives (p. 569) "some substantive evidence for a phonetically-
plausible rule that speakers do capture," and I feel that it is worthwhile 
to take a brief look at this discussion before proceeding to his arguments 
against phonetically-plausible rules. The rule in question, a fairly old 
one found in Savo dialects, geminates a consonant "when it is preceded 
by a short, stressed syllable and followed by a long vowel or diphthong . " 
Skousen's formalization of this rule is given in (31). 
(31) C ~ C: /V VV 
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Thus, for example, older tekoo 'he does' has become tekkoo in these dialects . 
Evidence that this rule (in this form) is still productive includes the 
f dct that recent l oan words undergo it, and that "more recent phonetic 
rules ... have set up surface exceptions to the rule of gemination," but 
"in every case , the rule of gemination eliminates these exceptions . " For 
example, in some of the Savo dialects a word- final sequence Vns has become 
Ws, so that a word like v~kens 'his people' (cf . standard Finnish vakensa) 
has become v&kees in these dialects . "A surface exception to the rule 
of gemination has bee9 created in the Savo dialects, but the rule of gemination 
has applied to give vakkees ••. " (p. 570). Thus, Skousen goes on, "there 
are phonetically-plausible regularities that speakers can capture . " The 
form of this argument thus appears to be that illustrated by the reconstruction 
given in (32), which is more or less the classical modus ponens form . 
(32) If a (phonetically-plausible) rule applies to the output 
of a rule which enters the language after the rule in 
question, then it has been captured by speakers . Gemina-
tion applies to the output of a later rule . Therefore, 
gemination has been captured by speakers. 
Skousen's first example of a "phonetically-plausible" rule which speakers 
do not capture concerns the well-known phenomenon of consonant gradation 
in Finnish, for which most generative phonologists have posited a rule 
which 'weakens' stops at the beginning of a closed syllable. The alterna-
tions to be accounted for (cf. Skousen 1972:571) are exemplified in (33). 
(33) p/v tapa/tavan 'custom' 
t/d pato/padon 'dam' 
k/~ sika/sian ' pig' 
pp/p piippu/piipun 'pipe' 
tt/t lantti/lantin 'coin' 
kk/k kirkko/kirkon ' church ' 
The above rule can be seen to account for these data : whenever there is 
an open syllable, the left member of the above pairs appears, while that 
on the right (the 'weakened' variant) shows up when there is a closed syllable . 
But this does not give an answer to the question which interests Skousen 
(p. 571), that of whether "speakers actually learn that gradation takes 
place in a closed syllable . " He maintains that the answer is the negative , 
and that "speakers learn that stems take the weakened form when certain 
specific suffixes are added; for example, they memorize that the geni tive 
suffix n and the inessive suffix ssa take the weak form of the stem without 
ever perceiving that both suffixes close the syllable . " Skousen's argument 
in favor of his position has to do first of all with a change found in 
several of the western dialects of Finnish , whereby the inessive suffix 
ssa became sa , apparently underlyingly as well as on the surface. In these 
dialects, standard kadessa shows up as karesa (where r , rather than d, 
is the weakened form of t in these dialects). "This ~nderlying inessive 
ending sa does not close-the preceding syllable. Nevertheless , speakers 
of these dialects continue to use the weak form kare with this ending rather 
than the strong form kate. There is no tendencytochange karesa to katesa 
(p.571). "This suggests," Skousen continues (pp . 571-2), "that throughout 
Finnish, speakers are simply memorizing that the inessive suffix takes 
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the weak form of the stem--no matter how the inessive suffix may change." 
He goes on (p. 572) to give a similar example concerning the possessive 
suffixes , which, he claims, "are always added to the strong stem," regardless 
of how these suffixes affect the phonological environment of the relevant 
consonant in the stem, in many dialects, including the standard language. 
"There is absolutely no evidence that speakers ever change the system so 
that [suffixes which begin with a single consonant] take the weak stem . " 
(I do not give the data with which this example is concerned, since it 
is so similar to the preceding example--see Skousen 1972:572 for the details). 
It is not clear from the discussion cited here what precise form Skousen 
intends his argument to take. However, he is more explicit in Skousen 
(1975 :60) concerning a different example having to do with consonant grada-
tion , and it is this more explicit presentation of the argument form which 
I will turn to now. I repeat this discussion here, replacing Skousen ' s 
"present passive form" (that being discussed in the passage under considera-
tion) by 'inessive and possessive forms', which are the focus of t he discussion 
at issue . Skousen states: "if the generative-phonological solution is 
correct , then the speaker would view the [inessive and possessive] forms 
as exceptional to the environment of gradation . And if the speaker must 
memorize this exceptional fact, we would expect some speakers . .. to change 
[these forms] so that [they] would conform to the environment of consonant 
gradation . . • However, there is no evidence for such changes ... " The argument 
thus appears to be reconstructible as in (34). 
(34) If speakers regard gradation as taking place in closed 
syllables, then the inessive and possessive will cause 
changes to conform to this environment. 
Such changes do not occur. 
Therefore, speakers do not regard gradation as taking 
place in this environment. 
This reconstruction, of course, has a modus tollens form. However, Skousen 
appears to want a considerably stronger conclusion , in addition to this 
one-- that particular suffixes determine whether or not gradation takes 
place . In order to warrant this further conclusion, an additional premise 
to the effect that the "generative phonological solution" and Skousen's 
proposal are the only possible ones is presumably needed . If this is added--
and Skousen seems to have operated under at least roughly such an assumption--
then the additional conclusion does of course follow . 
Let us now consider Skousen's argument against the second "phonetically-
plausible rule" usually posited by generative phonologists, that raising 
word-final e to i. In some western dialects, word-final k has been completely 
lost (p . 573), so that "any word ending in ek would now be a surface exception 
to the rule of e-raising since the k would be missing. Yet in no case 
does the purported rule e ->- i/_f! apply to eliminate this surface exception . " 
Another example of this type is "the allative suffix lle, which originally ended 
in a consonant that has now been deleted ... " The finale is not raised here, 
either. If this argument is intended to be of roughly the same form as the 
previous one (and cf . also Skousen 1975:67-8), then it can be reconstructed 
as in (35) . 
(35) If speakers have captured the rule of final ~-raising, 
then surface exceptions to it will be eliminated. 
Such exceptions are not eliminated. 
Therefore, speakers have not captured this rule. 
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This argument thus again appears to be of the modus tollens type. Since 
Skousen does not propose an alternative analysis in this case, we need 
not be concerned with strengthening it as in the last argument. 
The final argument to be considered concerns the standard generative 
rule which converts t to s before i. Skousen argues (p . 573) that 
"internally-created ~ords-such as neiti 'Miss' is [sic] never changed to 
neisi. Onomatopoetic words like lotina 'splashing' and tippa 'drop' have 
been created since the historical rule t ~ s/ i applied, yet speakers 
never allow a rule like the historical rule to apply ... Another example 
is the conditional ending isi, which originally came from nsi, where C 
represents a palatal consonant, .. The palatal n was later changed to the 
high i vowel, but after the historical rule t-~ s/ i had applied . Conse-
quently, a verb like pote 'to ce sick' has the conditional form potisi. 
Speakers never change this form to posisi." Since this argument is apparently 
intended to be of the same form as the previous ones (although tbere is 
no direct evidence in either of Skousen's works that this is indeed the 
case), I will not attempt a reconstruction of it . 
It can thus be seen that all three of Skousen's arguments are apparent-
ly intended to have tbe same (modus tollens) form; this form is indicated 
schematically in (36) . 
(36) If the standard analysis is correct, then certain 
changes would occur. 
No changes occur. 
Therefore, the standard analysis is incorrect. 
4 . 4 . 2. Kiparsky's reply . Kiparsky begins by claiming (p . 92) that "a 
more thorough look at the problem indicates that ... the rules which Skousen 
questions are very much in evidence as real synchronic processes of Finnish 
phonology." Before attempting to establish this claim, however, he first 
argues that "Skousen is surely right when he says that a phonological rule 
is real if 'surface violations' of it ... tend to get eliminated . But the 
converse claim, also made by Skousen, that a rule is not real if surface 
violations of a rule do not tend to become eliminated-:--ls too strong." 
For one thing, "the failure of a specific change to take place in a specific 
language at a specific period means nothing, since no one has been able 
toshowconditions under which a change, however natural, must take place ... the 
failure of surface violations of a rule to be eliminated cannot be used 
as proof that the rule is a linguists' figment" (pp . 92-93). Moreover, 
he continues (p. 93), "all 'surface violations' of a rule need not be excep-
tions to it, and if they are not, there is no reason why they should become 
eliminated." Thus, in the case of tbe _!:. s/ i rule discussed above,-1-
although the examples Skousen adduces are indeeed correct, "it is in those 
cases which are necessarily memorized, namely the morpheme-internal cases, 
that the t + s rule does not apply." Kiparsky's justification for the 
"necessarily"-part of this claim is his argument earlier in his paper (cf. 
especially pp. 65-7) that "non-automatic neutralization processes apply 
only" when the environment is not "met already in the underlying representa-
tion of a simple morpheme." Since Skousen's examples are of this type, 
Kiparsky's proposal with respect to possible synchronic systems disallows 
the changes which Skousen maintains are necessary to establjsh the existence 
of a rule which has been "captured" by speakers; therefore, if Kiparsky's 
proposal is correct, '' there is no reason to expect" Skousen' s examples 
to undergo the t - s rule. 
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Kiparsky argues further, as alluded to at the beginning of this sub-
section, that there is external evidence for the rules which Skousen argues 
against, One rule which he discusses in ~nection with this concern 
is that of gradation. In the closely related language of Votic, claims 
Kiparsky (p. 94), "the inessive -ssa also went to -sa" (as in the dialects 
discussed by Skousen). Here the part of the gradation rule which affects 
nongeminates works as in the cases which Skousen described, but "the 
degemination rule has 'caught up' with the new form of the suffix and 
fails to apply, e.g . , /nokka+sa/ nokkaza 'in the beak' (not *nokaza, 
which would be the expected form)." 
A similar sort of evidence, Kiparsky continues, is available concerning 
the!+~ rule. In support of this contention, he argues (p. 94) that 
"there is one form class where the rule does seem to have been extended 
to new cases meeting its structural analysis which arose after the rule 
entered the language: the past tense form of vowel stem verbs . " The 
stem vowel contracts (pp. 94-5), "under certain conditions, with the past 
tense suffix -i into i. .. " This i triggers the rule in some verbs, does 
so optionallyin others, and does-not allow it in still others. Kiparsky 
maintains that this contraction rule historically postdated the t + s 
rule, and that the latter has therefore applied, at least in som; cases, 
to the output of an historically later rule. Since most historians of 
Finnish hold that the opposite sequence was the one which actually obtained 
(and, if so, it cannot be maintained that there is an historically later 
rule whose output the!+~ rule affects). Kiparsky must argue against 
these contentions; he offers "five reasons why this view of the historical 
developments is the more likely one." 
I will detail here only the fifth argument, which Kiparsky apparently 
feels is the most convincing, since he states (p. 99) that he believes 
that it alone would "suffice to establish the point." It concerns "the 
behavior of t before contracted i elsewhere than in the past tense." He 
states that "in all of these cas;s, not only is t the rule, but there 
are no traces of any kind, either in standard Finnish, or in dialects, 
or in the older literary documents, of the s which the standard theory 
claims must once have existed in them." He-then asks "why this discrepancy 
between contracted~ (in these cases) which never triggers.!_+~, and 
the contracted i of the past tense, which normally triggers s?" He continues 
that while 
... the customary chronology offers no explanation; if instead we assume 
that t + s preceded contraction, the reason is clear. The difference 
between the past tense, where!+~ was extended to new l's, and all 
other cases, where t + s was not extended, is that the change t + s 
before underlying /i/ happens to occur only in the past tense.--:-.Prior 
to contraction, therefore, the process.!_+~ was applicable in the 
past tense, but in no forms in the other categories,, ..After contraction, 
the situation was, from a surface point of view, that.!_ went to~ 
always before i from finale ... , sometimes before i in the past tense 
.•. , and never-before i's in other categories (where all i's came 
from contraction) ... Hence, a 'model' for the extension of-.!_+~ to 
new i's existed only in the past tense. 
(Kiparsky 1973a:99-100) 
That is, while verbs must be marked in the past tense as to whether or 
not they undergo!+~, and we thus expect elimination of these markings, 
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in the other cases there is a general (presumably morphological) character-
ization of the forms which do not undergo this process, and so we do not 
expect eliminations of 'exceptions' which do not reaJly exist. 
Kiparsky gives no discussion of the final ~-raising rule. 
4 . 4.3 . Discussion. As notedin section 4.4 . 2, Kiparsky has no quarrel 
with Skousen's argument as reconstructed in (32). This suggests that the 
major premise in this argument should be considered as a potential 'univer-
sal ' of historical change (see section 5 for f urther discussion). 
But Kiparsky does of course take exception to Skousen's argument concern-
ing consonant gradation. The issue in this case appears to boil down to 
whether or not the major premise in (34) is in fact true . First of all, 
there is the question of Kiparsky's proposed constraint on the applicability 
of "non-automatic neutralization processes" mentioned above. If this 
constraint is in fact legitimate, and if the only examples in which grada-
tion has not been extended to conform to its putative "phonetically-pausible" 
environment do conform to the type of case contraindicated by Kiparsky's 
constraint, then it seems clear that we cannot expect the changes in many 
cases which Skousen's major premise in (34) predicts, and so this premise 
would be (at least partly) false. I know of no obvious counterexamples 
to Kiparsky's proposal, and my knowledge of Finnish is sufficiently limited 
that I have nothing f urther to say concerning either of the conjuncts of 
the if-clause in the above sentence. 
Furthermore, as Kiparsky suggests, there does indeed seem to be some 
reason to question this premise even apart from this constraint, especially 
if there is no time frame referred to in this argument. However, since 
there seems to be an implicit such time frame in Skousen ' s argument, this 
consideration is open to question. That is, it is possible that an 
argument containing a premise to the effect that it is likely that certain 
changes would occur given a fair amount of time will be somewhat more 
legitimate than the one which Kiparsky argues against. Discussion of 
this issue, however, will be held off until section 5. 
Moreover, given that Kiparsky objects even to the minor premise, further 
discussion of this issue seems to rel egate the f ormer question to a position 
of relatively minor importance at this point. The question thus currently 
concerns the truth or falsity of the minor premise . That is, has the grada-
tion rule in fact been generalized, contrary to Skousen's claims? Kiparsky's 
argument that the answer to this question is in the affirmative, as noted 
above, concerns evidence from (p. 94) a "closely related language." There 
is thus some question as to exactly how closely related this language (Votic) 
really is to Finnish, but I can offer no further comment on this issue, 
since the reference which Kiparsky cites in this regard is written in Finnish. 
It should be noted in this respect, however, that i f Votic is sufficiently 
closely related to Finnish in the relevant respects, then the minor premise 
in (34) does indeed appear to be false . 
As for the rule converting t to s before i, Kiparsky does not comment 
on it with respect to his proposed constraint in his reply to Skousen . 
He does, however, use this rul e as a supporting example when he argues 
for this constraint (pp . 61, 64), so he presumably would consider his objection 
discussed above as being relevant in this case as well. He also, of course, 
cl aims that this rule has in fact been extended to apply to the output 
of an historically prior rule, thus apparent l y contesting the minor premise 
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of Skousen's argument. This issue is, as Kiparsky points out, highly contro-
versial, and in fact depends crucially on Kiparsky's account of the chronology 
of the rules involved. There is thus some question as to whether Kiparsky' s 
contention in this respect is correct. 
How reasonable is Kiparsky's account of the chronology, then? It 
seems to me that it is indeed correct that "the customary chronology offers 
no explanation" of the facts cited in the argument discussed above . Moreover, 
the other arguments which Kiparsky offers (which were not discussed here) 
also seem fairly convincing, for the most part. That is, the traditional 
account d.oes not appear to have much to recommend it. However, it should 
be pointed out that Kiparsky's account requires that the historically later 
contraction rule be added to the grammar of Finnish in such a way that 
it precedes the t + s rule. Since the latter is, according to Kiparsky, 
a "non-automatic-neutralization rule," this account violates King's (1973) 
constraint against "rule insertion." Not only must there be such a rule 
insertion on this account, but all forms which would meet the structural 
description oft+ s as a result of the operation of the inserted rule 
mus_t be marked as eiceptions to the t + s rule, since it is potentially 
fed by contraction in these cases (it is-true, of course, as Kiparsky points 
out, that some of the exceptional cases are generally characterizable, 
but I am not sure how relevant this fact is in this context) . A situation 
such as that just described would only be possible, as Kiparsky notes, 
if synchronic phonological theory is altered fairly substantially so that 
the more or less obvious synchronic description, assuming the possibility 
of extrinsic ordering of rules, of the state of affairs before the extension 
of the t + s rule (i.e., ordering contraction after this rule) is not the 
most highly-valued description in a case such as this . It should be noted 
in this regard that ruling out in principle counterfeeding orders (along 
with, e.g., Koutsoudas, Sanders and Noll 1974), an alternative which Kiparsky 
appears to give serious consideration, would entail that all of the "rule 
reorderings" out of counterfeeding order which Kiparsky and others have 
advocated cannot be the correct account of the changes involved. There are, 
however, as Kiparsky has also noted, other alternatives. In sum, Kiparsky's 
account seems to be less than totally convincing. 
What is more, there seems to be a perfectly plausible way of accounting 
for the pattern of extension of the!:_/~ alternations even if the t + s 
rule is no longer alive synchronically, namely that the traditional concept 
of "analogy" is involved. That is, the t/s alternation is being extended 
only in the past tense because it is only here, as Kiparsky notes (see 
above), that there is "a 'model' for the extension of" this alternation. 
Formally, what is going on under this approach is sketched in (37), where 
V represents any vowel other than i and Q is the morphological category 
involved, with the obvious solution to this proportional equation being 
'x = s' . 
(37) tV: si]Q :: tV : xi]Q 
Notice that the only occasion in which the left hand side of this formula 
will occur is when Q is past tense--there are no instances of [si] (only 
[ti] in the other morphological categories discussed by Kiparsky . Thus 
the facts which he cited in the argument discussed here seem amenable 
to an alternative account, if the chronology is as he argues it is. It 
should be noted that this solution does not require rule insertion, since 
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it does not require the existence of the t + s rule and therefore of course 
does not require any particular ordering relationship between it and the 
contraction rule . It seems to me that the other data cited by Kiparsky 
would be amenable to a precisely analogous account. 
I have no way of telling whether the Votic facts discussed in connec-
tion with the gradation rule are also amenable to thls type of account, 
since Kiparsky presents very little data, and since it would be difficult, 
it not impossible, for me to find further data. 
It should be pointed out that this type of account entails rejecting 
the premise that a rule is synchronically valid if surface violations of 
it tend to get eliminated. Further discussion of this question will be 
given in the next section . 
5. Conclusion. It should be clear that all of the arguments examined 
in section 4, at least if they are interpreted perhaps somewhat charitably, 
can be considered as instances of elementary logically valid forms of infer-
ence--classical modus ponens and modus tollens (or, probably more realisti-
cally in many cases, the 'almost' variants of these mentioned in section 
3), and the Bayesian form schematized in (2). 
This situation, in my experience, is quite characteristic of arguments 
given by linguists (although there are, perhaps inevitably, some exceptions), 
and I suspect that it is generally true of arguments given in any science. 
This should not seem surprising, since linguists and other scientists are, 
at least indirectly (and sometimes directly), schooled in logical analysis . 
In fact, it seems to me that it is a good rule of thumb for a methodologist 
to follow that if it appears that an investigator is committing an elementary 
logical fallacy, then the methodological analysis itself is not unlikely 
to be faulty and that it therefore merits considerable scrutiny. I would 
suggest also in this respect that it is in general more likely that any 
lack of persuasive power felt concerning the arguments in question is pro-
bably due to a corresponding lack of belief in the truth of the premises 
involved in a logically valid argument form. That is not to say, of course, 
that investigators are never guilty of such logical fallacies (there are 
undoubtedly a number of quite genuine cases of this kind), but this need 
not compromise the value of this suggested rule of thumb as such. I would 
thus regard the putative discovery of an ever-increasing number of new 
types of fallacies (concerning mainly arguments in favor of extrinsic rule 
ordering--cf., for example, Koutsoudas 1972) as cases of somewhat misguided 
methodological analysis, and would maintain that what is actually involved 
here is disagreement concerning the truth of (implicit) premises in the 
arguments in question. This should not be taken as implying that such 
methodological studies have no value, for they have often provided good 
reasons for questioning the premises at issue (at least in my opinion), 
but terming such arguments 'fallacious' adds a rhetorical effect to the 
criticism that does not seem to me to be appropriate in such cases; investi-
gators can differ with respect to beliefs about the truth of premises without 
one of them necessarily being found lacking in a necessary skill of the 
field--that of constructing logically valid arguments--which is not of 
course the case if he is in actuality guilty of a logical fallacy . Adopting 
such a rule of thumb, moreover, appears to be quite in keeping with the 
approach of many contemporary philosophers of science (cf . , e.g., Suppe 
1977), who place considerable weight on the actual practice of working 
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scientists. The work of the 'best' scientists is, not too surprisingly, 
held to be of the most importance by such investigators, and I would have 
to go along with them in this respect as well: we should be doubly skeptical 
when our methodological analysis entails that a classical argument (i.e., 
one which has met with considerable acceptance over a fairly long period 
of time) involves a logical fallacy.24 
What is important as far as the evaluation of the arguments discussed 
above is concerned is thus the truth (or likelihood) of the premises involved. 
I would like to turn now to a brief consideration of this issue. This 
is an especially important concern, since at least some of these premises 
(or generalizations or revisions of them) are relevant not only to these 
arguments, but also potentially to other arguments which invoke diachronic 
data. 
The major premise (5) of Kiparsky's argument in favor of the brace 
notation is, unfortunately (especially given the amount of attention it 
has received), not one of these. It appears to be quite specific to this 
particular argument, and I can see no obvious way of generalizing it. There 
is a lesson which can be gained from a consideration of this premise, 
however: the perceived cogency of an argument from historical change (or 
any other, for that matter) will vary with the degree of belief of each 
individual investigator concerning the truth of the premises involved. 
In this case, Kiparsky (and Chomsky and Halle) apparently found the relevant 
historical changes to indeed be quite unlikely unless the brace notation 
was psychologically real; Stampe, on the other hand, did not and was thus 
unconvinced by the argument--despite his acknowledgment of its "beauty". 
As pointed out above, evaluating the truth of this premise depends ultimately 
on (one's degree of belief in) the correctness of Kiparsky's (and Stampe's) 
synchronic analyses of Old English and Early Middle English . Moreover, 
in this case--and in many others, I would maintain--there is no clear way 
of establishing the required "correctness"--the problematic forms adduced 
by Stampe could always be given an (ad hoc explanation, especially by 
a staunch syllable opponent. Whether or not a given investigator finds 
this argument (and other, perhaps all, arguments as well) convincing thus 
depends in the final analysis on essentially subjective factors. 
As for the Hooper-Harris debate, the major premise (12') appears to 
be more readily generalizable, although even here what is probably the 
most obvious generalization--namely, that leveling not in the direction 
of the putative underlying form is problematic for a diacritic theory--
is not terribly general . Here again the ultimate evaluation of this pre-
mise depends on subjective factors. The diacriticist could, for example, 
maintain that there is an implicit ceteris paribus clause attached to the 
prediction of direction of leveling, and that in the case(s) at issue there 
are other essentially irrelevant factors which are responsible for the 
'failure' of the prediction. (In this particular case, in addition, the 
apparent similarity of the prediction made by the Hooperian analysis would 
likely mitigate the force of an objection based on this premise . ) I can 
see no really objective way of determining whether or not these other factors 
are in fact irrelevant. The differences in directionality of leveling 
with respect to different dialects are suggestive, however, and I will 
return to this question below. 
In the case of the Schuh-Leben controversy, what appears to be behind 
the major premise in (21) is something which is very similar to the principle 
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just mentioned: ' underlying ' forms are favored in cases of analogical 
change. Similar sorts of questions can of course be asked about this principle . 
Leben's particular response concerning the directionality involved does 
have its problematic aspects, but this is not to say that there is no other 
analysis which does not require inverse rules which can make this direction-
ality seem reasonable; the force of this argument depends on a subjective 
degree of belief in the likelihood of the possibility of such an alternative 
analysis. Similarly, an evaluation of the major premise in (24) (which 
does not seem amenable to generalization) depends on subjective factors, 
although, as pointed out above, Leben's particular synchronic analysis 
of the phenomenon in question is not without its problematic aspects. Here, 
too, however, nothing precludes a successful noninverted analysis. Since 
it appears that nothing new can be learned from a reconsideration of the 
remaining arguments given by Schuh, I will not discuss them here. 
As noted in section 4.4 . 3, the major premise in (32) deserves serious 
consideration; 
in (38). 
I give a somewhat generalized form of this premise below 
(38) If a rule applies to forms which have appeared in the 
language, then it is psychologically real (i.e., "has 
been capc:ured by speakers"). 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that it can be maintained. For one thing, 
how are we to tell if the if-clause in (38) is satisfied? The fact that 
a change in a form could be the result of the (productive) application 
of a synchronic rule is not sufficient to establish that the putative rule 
is indeed present in the languge at the sLage in question, as long as thi:e 
is the possibility that there may be no rules involved in either the cha1,ge 
or the synchronic alternations which preceded the change . It does not 
seem at all unlikely, moreover, that this possibility should be taken serio1 3-
ly, given that the direction of leveling does not appear to be predictable. 
That is, the different directions of leveling found in Spanish dialects 
(cf. section 4.2) could be taken to indicate, as Hooper suggests, that 
different speakers can have different rules, or that speakers have no rules 
at all for the phenomena at issue; I know of no clear way of distinguishing 
these two alternatives empirically (cf. note 16). To be more explicit 
about this new possibility, what I am suggesting (and I emphasize thatat 
this stage it is only a suggestion) is that, except for productive processes 
and external sandhi alternations, speakers capture no psychologically real 
regularities (to use Skousen ' s terminology); i.e., other than in the cases 
just mentioned, speakers simply memorize the words of their language in 
roughly their classical phonemic representations, and they learn no rules 
(either morphological or phonological) to relate these words. 25 If a speaker 
does not know a word, then he quite literally uses analogy (cf . section 
4.4.3) to come up with the required ' new' word.26 Often the result of 
this use of analogy will be the word which already exists in the language, 
but sometimes speakers will not be 'successful ' in their use of analogy, 
in that they come up with something that has heretofore not been accepted 
as a word of the language. In such cases, and if the new word meets with 
acceptance, there will have been an analogical change. 
This possibility depends crucially, of course, on the nonpredictability 
of the direction of leveling, and I would like to briefly present some 
further evidence for such a nonpredictability . 27 The Spanish facts are 
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not isolated ones, and Skousen (1975) gives some discussion of some similar 
examples from the history of French. For example (p. 36), "the verb boire, 
according to the normal historical development, should have a future-condi-
tional stem buvr-", and it did have for some time in the history of French, 
but it "has now been replaced by the stem boir-", so that the alternation 
in the stem for this verb has been leveled out in favor of the infinitive. 
However, we find (pp . 38-9) that "in Old French, infinitive forms like 
ardoir and saillir were replaced by ardre and saudre. The future forms 
of these verbs were historically ardra and saudra . " Thus, here again the 
stem alternation has been leveled out, but this time in favor of the future , 
Skousen interprets these data as evidence that some speakers "learn that 
the future-conditional stem is the same as the infinitive" (p. 36), while 
others "have learned the reverse pattern--that the infinitive is based 
on the future-conditional stem" (p. 37), but unless we can predict which 
speakers are going to make which analysis, and/or which of these analyses 
will 'win out' in cases involving leveling, we are still not going to be 
able to predict the direction of leveling (cf. also note 16). Skousen 
gives at least two further examples of this type (cf. the discussion of 
the development of parler and araisonner, and of aimer and clamer (pp. 
43-5)) as well. 
Skousen's discussion of these levelings is of some interest, it seems 
to me, and I will digress here a bit to give some attention to this discus-
sion. One of the main points of Skousen's monograph is (e.g., p. 41) that 
" . .• analogical changes fof the type discussed above] can be used as evidence 
for a psychologically real regularity between the infinitive and the future-
conditional stem . " Furthermore, he has (p. 41) "been using a restricted 
theory of analogy. In particular, [he has] assumed that analogical changes 
are not random, but occur in directions...Analogical changes occur when 
speakers remove exceptions to psychologically real regularities." He continues 
(p. 42) that "in this sense, analogical change is viewed not as the speaker ' s 
attempt to create a surface regularity, but rather as an attempt to eliminate 
surface exceptions to a surface regularity that has already been captured," 
Thus, Skousen appears to be proposing something quite contrary to what 
I have just suggested--any analogical change, for Skousen, suffices to 
establish the existence----;y a rule(= "psychologically real regularity"). 
This seems to be a stronger claim than Hooper's concerning similar facts 
(cf . note 16 and the related discussion), and also an incorrect one, at 
least if the concept "psychologically real regularity" is given a nontrivial 
interpretation. 
Consider, for example, the development of the now quasi-productive 
-burger morpheme in English (cf. Jeffers and Lehiste 1979). There was 
of course originally a single word hamburger which consisted of two morphemes, 
hamburg and -er, but after this word had been (mis)analyzed as having the 
morphological composition ham+burger (presumably due to the presence of 
the word ham in the language), the new morpheme -burger has been extended 
so that there are now in English such words as cheeseburger and fishburger 
(cf. also Burger King, Burger Chef). Note that this development began 
with a single form, so unless we are willing to claim that a "psychologi-
cally real regularity" can be derived from a single example (and what could 
constitute an irregularity if this were the case?), it appears that Skousen's 
claim cannot beupheld. Another example of this type concerns the recently 
developed -(a)holic morpheme, which again appears to be the result of a 
misanalysis of a single form as alc+oholic (we now have words like workaholic, 
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gumaholic, etc.). (For discussion of a somewhat similar case concerning 
the development of the Latin infinitive, cf. Jeffers and Lehiste 1979.) 
The upshot of all this is that (38), at least in its present form, 
cannot be maintained. But how about a somewhat weaker version? One could 
suggest, for example, that analogical changes which could be the result 
of the application of productive or external sandhi rules are evidence 
for the psychological reality of such rules . But even this has its problematic 
aspects. What is the difference between a productive rule and a nonproductive 
one? And how can we be sure that our proposed rule, and not another (more 
or less) empirically equivalent rule, is responsible for the change? Even 
the strongest tenable version of (38) must apparently be rather weak with 
respect to such factors, probably weaker than that just suggested, and 
will thus be of correspondingl) little use in evaluating synchronic analyses. 
One final alteration of this principle will be suggested here, one 
which in fact appears quite plausible to me, although I know of no conclusive 
reasons for maintaining it. (Here again, then, the success of arguments 
incorporating this principle as a premise apparently will ultimately depend 
on a subjective evaluat the truth of this principle by each individual 
investigator.) The alteration involves the kind of changes involved, ln 
particular whether or not they are across-the-board ones . The final version 
of this principle is given more explicitly in (39) below. 
(39) If a putative -rule applies to every possible input for 
the rule which arises after the postulated entry of the 
rule into the language, then it is psychologically real . 
In fact, it could be that Skousen had something of this nature in mind, 
rather than the (reconstructed) major premise in (32), since he claims 
(Skousen 1972:569) that "in every case, the rule of gemination eliminates 
[the relevant] exceptions" (emphasis added). 
Let us turn now to an examination of the major premise in (36). 
This version undoubtedly should be generalized even further if it is to 
be considered as a universal principle of language change; a further general-
ization is given below in (36'). 
(36') If a putative rule is psychologically real, then (rele-
vant) changes will occur. 
As noted above, Kiparsky rejects this principle, and it is sufficiently 
vague anyway (when will the changes occur?) that it would require revision 
in any event. ~seems to me that a principle such as (36"), in which 
(36 ' ) has been made probabilistic and a time frame has been added, deserves 
serious consideration, although agajn it is not clear to me what sorts 
of evj_dence would be relevant to determining its truth or falsity. 
(36") If a putative rule is psychologically real, then 
(relevant) changes are 1ikely to occur within 
several centuries. 
As noted above (section 4.4.3), Skousen may have implicitly maintained 
such a time frame. It is perhaps worth noting that even Kiparsky may sub-
scribe to a principle such as this, since he did not stop at proclaiming 
that the major premise in (36) was false, but proceeded to argue that the 
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minor premise in this argument is also false . The answer to questions 
concerning the relevance of historical data to determining the structure 
of a synchronic grannnar thus again appears to depend in large part on 
the subjective degree of belief of each individual researcher in the premises 
of the argument at issue. 
The emphasis which I have given to the role played by subjective factors 
in explicating the relative convincingness of an argument will undoubtedly 
be disturbing to some, and I must admit that I am somewhat uncomfortable 
about it myself. But if it is believed that it is desirable that the 
philosophy of science reflect in large part the actual practice of scientists 
(as, again, is now widely held--cf . Suppe 1977 and the references cited 
there), then such a conclusion seems to me to be inescapable. Again, I 
do not mean to claim that investigators are never guilty of assigning truth 
values to premises in an intuitively undesirable manner, but I can see 
no nonarbitrary way of proscribing such 'undesirable' behavior . A fair 
amount of disagreement about the reality of received 'knowledge' in any 
given field thus appears to be inevitable, unless there is widespread agree-
ment in the field concerning the premises which play a substantial role 
in the arguments advanced in these fields (i.e., unless there is a "paradigm" 
in a fairly strong sense of this term as used by Kuhn 1970). This is perhaps 
a somewhat pessimistic view to take of scientific knowledge, but if the 
cases considered here are at all representative of linguistic research, 
and if linguistics is a more or less representative science (as the non-
linguistic arguments discussed in Churma 1979 : Chapter II at least suggest), 
then such an approcah seems to be inevitable. The truth (or likelihood) 
of at least the major premises in most scientific arguments (not just argu-
ments from historical change) simply is not decided on in practice by 
'objective' means, and for the most part is not in principle decidable 
in such ways . But the situation is not as chaotic under this view as the 
subjective nature of the evaluations might lead one to believe, and in 
fact the framework points to an intuitively reasonable procedure in cases 
of disagreement about the force of an argument. With the isolation of 
the crucial premises involved, proper attention can be given to research 
concerning these premises; an investigator who is convinced of the falsity 
of such a premise can seek out counterexamples, and an adherent of one 
can attempt to marshal evidence which makes the premise more likely. But we 
will never have certain knowledge in any empirical field, I would suggest. 
It is worth noting in this regard that if the truth of the premises 
in the Bayesian arguments (and probably the others as well--cf. Churma 
1979:Chapter II, Appendix) is objectively ascertainable,then the much dis-
cussed 'problem of induction' (cf., e.g., Salmon 1967) will have been solved. 
Given the lack of success in the solution of this problem in the past few 
hundred years, one could, it seems to me, reasonably look at a putative 
solution to this problem with a fair amount of reservation . The subjecti-
vity required in my interpretation thus seems to me to be in some sense 
a virtue of such an approach, rather than a liability; while one might 
in principle desire certain knowledge, it seems that, as suggested above, 
in practice it is not possible, and that therefore an approach which claims 
to provide such knowledge is questionable solely on this basis. Thus, 
would maintain that it is not possible to reduce inductive inference 
(in particular, Bayesian inference) to deductive inference, and that to 
hold that it is possible (as in establishing with certainty the probabili-
ties involved in a Bayesian argument) involves a fundamental misconception. 
(For further discussion of this point, cf. Churma 1979 Ch . II . ) 
I 
- 51 -
One final positive note deserves mention in this respect. This concerns 
the fact that, as Salmon (1967:122) puts it, in spite of the 'problem' 
that "the prior convictions of reasonable people can vary considerably," 
Bayes' Theorem entails that "as these individuals accumulate a shared body 
of observational evidence, the differences of opinion will tend to disappear 
and aconsensus will emerge." That is, differences in prior probability 
assignments are more or less irrelevant, as long as the "shared body of 
observational evidence" is large enough; as long as enough evidence can 
be found, rational investigators will eventually be forced to have roughly 
the same degrees of belief concerning 'well-supported' hypotheses. Until 
such a body of evidence is accumulated, however, the main determinant of 
relative persuasiveness of a given argument will be the degree of belief 
of ea~hindivldual investigator in the truth of the premises of that argument, 
and this degree of belief may, of course, vary from person to person . The 
premises of arguments which invoke data from historical change are no differ-
ent from any others in this respect, and so the value of such arguments 
for the purpose of assessing the descriptive adequacy of proposed grammar 
fragments apparently must be tied correspondingly to the relevant subjective 
degrees of belief. 
Footnotes 
i<This paper is a revised version of parts of my dissertation (Churma 
1979), mostly Chapter III. I would like to thank Fred Householder, Wayne 
Redenbarger, David Stampe, and Arnold Zwicky for helpful discussion of 
the issues involved. 
l 
I extend here (naturally, I feel) Chomsky's concept of descriptive 
adequacy so that a partial grammar is descriptively adequate if it is (or 
would be) part of a complete descriptively adequate grammar. It is perhaps 
appropriate that I give here at least a working definition of what I consider 
a descriptively adequate grammar to be: following Chomsky and Halle (1965:99), 
such a grammar " ... gives a correct account of the speaker's 'tacit knowledge'" 
of his language. The term 'tacit knowledge ' here should prevent any mis-
understanding which might arise if Chomsky's (1964:63) term ''linguistic 
intuition" (Chomsky apparently considers the two expressions to be equiva-
lent) is employed--the latter could create the impression that the issues 
at stake in phonological controversies may be settled by direct appeals 
to the "linguistic intuition" of native speakers about the constructs in 
question. On the contrary, most (if not all) contemporary phonologists 
appear to agree that intuitive judgments about the validity of these con-
structs cannot be made by speakers with any degree of reliability. The 
'tacitness' of the knowledge involved is thus crucial. 
2
In my experience, it is almost always the truth of the premises involved 
which is at issue when disagreements as to the force of an argument arise--
even if one of the adversaries claims that the other is guilty of a 'logical 
fallacy.' In addition, the implicitness of the premises in many arguments 
will often add to the difficulties. For further discussion of this question , 
see Churma 19 7 9 , Ch . I II . 
3
For a similar discussion of the areas of child language acquisition 
and word games, see Churma 1979 . For an essentially complete list of 
of the types of data used as external evidence in the literature, see Zwicky 
1975 . 
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4
Thus, the present study can be considered as an attempt to provide 
what Botha (1979b) calls "bridge principles" for relating synchrony and 
diachrony in phonology. It is worth pointing out here that this latter 
work (cf . also Botha 1979a) presents what appears to me to be a rather 
distorted interpretation of the views concerning external evidence expressed 
by Chomsky (1976). Contrary to Botha (p. 39) , who interprets passages 
from Chomsky (pp . 5-6) as entailing that Chomsky feels that external evidence 
is not necessary "for the validation of mentalistic claims", it seems that 
what Chomsky actually intends here is that (p. 12), given the current state 
of linguistic research, internal evidence is likely to be more valuable, 
given the essential lack of relevant "bridge principles" in the case of 
external evidence . As Botha would undoubtedly be the first to admit, the 
relevance of external evidence to synchronic analysis is far from clear 
without such principles. And external evidence would be necessary, of 
course, in cases where internal evidence alone does not allow for a choice 
between two alternative accounts . Botha has also made some other rather 
dist~rbing misinterpretations of Chomsky's views on psychological reality 
and external evidence, in my opinion, but this is not the place to go into 
them. 
5The only works of this type of which I am aware are the long (and for 
the most part misguided, in my opinion--cf. section 4.2.3 for details) 
discussion of an argument from historical change given by Kiparsky (1968) 
in Botha 1973 and the brief discussion of arguments from historical change 
in Sommerstein 1977 . The latter discussion, though perhaps of some rele-
vance to the concerns of this study, will not be examined here, since it 
appeals only to hypothetical examples; the cases examined here all come 
from actual arguments in the literature in favor of or opposed to a given 
analysis of natural language data. 
6The "at least partially" qualification is intended to allow for 'supra-
segmental' or 'prosodic' features of speech, i.e . , ones which are not of 
the same character as the more 1ordinary' features traditionally made use 
of in linguistic analysis, such as those employed in Firthian prosodic 
anaysis or Harrisian 'long components', and more recently in the work of 
Leben (1973) and Goldsmith (1976). 
7rt has often been argued that there exists a level of representation 
intermediate to the levels of lexical representation and systematic phonetic 
representation. Since these arguments do not make use of the type of 
evidence at issue here , as far as I know, they will not be considered here , 
nor will the issue be pursued further. 
8The "somewhat" qualification is meant to reflect the fact that, if 
the probability that A is true= p, the probability that Bis true given 
that A is true = ..9.., and the probability that B is ti:-ue = E_, then r < p . q . 
See Churma 1979, Appendix for a pi:-oof. 
9Note that, if expressed in this way, the argument appears to say 
nothing at all about the psychological reality of braces, but only about 
whether or not they are "part of linguistic theory." This is a rather 
trivial problem (although Botha(l973)apparently does not agree, as will 
be seen in section 4 .1.3), since it is clear from the last part of the 
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first paragraph quoted above that Kiparsky feels that the theory is making 
claims about psychological reality. In other words, a construct is part 
of linguistic theory if, and only if, it is psychologically real. When 
we combine this with the conclusion of the preceding argument (that the 
brace notation is supported as being part of linguistic theory), we of 
course have the conclusion that its psychol ogical reality is supported. 
lOThe requirement that Ebe at least fairly likely if His true is 
not explicit in (2). In fact, as (2) is stated, this requirement can only 
be arrived at as the result o f some sort of Gricean implicature (cf. Grice 
1975). Such a requirement seems intuitively quite reasonable, and moreover 
appears to be supported by the more exp l icit version of (2) mentioned above. 
See Churma 1979, Ch. II for details. 
11 rt is not clear that any data are of this type; see, for example, 
Kuhn 1970 
12"Rule 19" referred to by Harris is a lexical redundancy rule which 
expresses the fact that "only third-conjugation verbs have the mid/high 
and mid/high/diphthong alternations" (Hooper 1976:161). It is given formally 
in (i). 
(i) -sylll[ +high 
Co] b I S ALWAYS [+ 3rd c, nj.]
ver 
+syll l
[+high 
It should also be pointed out that Rarris's description of the change 
in the form of rule (1) appears to be different from that of Hooper, since 
she implies that rule (2) above is the only relevant rule which remains 
after the change, so that the entire second case, not just its environ-
ment, has been lost from rule (1). 
13Rule 14 is a lexical redundancy statement which is roughly equivalent 
to part of rule (i) in note 12, and indicates (Harris 1978:47) that the 
diacritic "[HM] appears only on the last nonlow vowel of a relatively small 
number of third-conjugation stems." It is given in (i). 
(i) 
JIf [HM], then #X C ti.+syll 0
-lowl
3 conj 
14
For a very similar formulation, cf. Harris (1978:56). 
15
There remains Harris' s point that "nothing in Hooper's account reflects 
the fact that diphthongization is lost in one particular morphological 
subclass ... " This appears to be quite true, but since there appears to 
I 
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be nothing to prevent Hooper from adding to the grammar of the innovating 
dialects a "special statement" analogous to that of Harris to this effect , 
will not pursue this point further. 
16
There is of course also the possibility that, as Hooper puts it 
(p. 167), "different speakers may arrive at different analyses of the same 
data . .. ," so one could claim that a somewhat different rule--one in which 
the diphthong is in fact the elsewhere case in the relevant part of the 
rule--is present in the dialects which level in favor of the diphthongs. 
If this is true, however, it is impossible to disconfirm the theory with 
facts from historical change, given the essential lack of constraints on 
the form which rules may take, since it will always be possible to formulate 
a rule in which the favored variant is the elsewhere case. Thus, the theory 
would be making essentially no empirical claims, despite the invocation 
of 'external evidence,' as well as having no predictive power concerning 
the direction of leveling . 
17
For a fuller examination of the issue of whether "rule inversion 
in Chadic" has in fact occurred, see Churma (ms.) 
18As Leben (1974:269) points out, this rule (or another one) must 
apparently also convert stem-final -e in verbs to~ between a stop and 
a sonorant consonant. Leben treats it as being part of the epenthesis 
rule, formulating it as in (i) . 
C 
(i) (f'} ->, e /[-son] [+son)
e 
(Schuh is not very explicit on any of the rules in this part of his article, 
and it is somewhat difficult to tell exactly what he intends.) It is not 
clear that these phenomena actually can be treated as a single rule, since 
there are cases where -e alternates with! (see below) . 
19Following Leben, I modify here the Hausa orthography used by Schuh 
to reflect thew output of Klingenheben's Law. The orthographic~ is retained 
in direct quotations from Schuh, however, so it is of some importance to 
remember that his uu and au correspond to my (and Leben's) ~ and aw . 
20Leben (1977a, b) has recently given revised analyses of Hausa plurals 
in the framework of "upside-down" phonology (cf. Leben and Robinson 1977). 
Since this is not relevant to the present discussion, it will not be consi-
dered here. For some general criticisms of the upside-down framework, 
see Churma 1980b , Janda 1980. 
21rhis is an example of the type alluded to in note 18, where the 
- e must be deleted rather than converted to schwa . It is not clear to 
me from Newman's discussion what the precise conditions on -e deletion 
are . 
22For a perhaps equally plausible alternative account of these develop-
ments in the Hausa plural system within an inverted rule framework, cf. 
Churma (ms.) . 
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23since Leben's main concern seems to be to restrict as much as possible 
the range of permissible analyses of language data (by, in t his case , elimina-
ting the "middleman" of inverse rules "from the realm of possible phono-
logical systems"--cf. Leben , pp. 265-6), it is not clear that Leben ' s own 
proposal does not violate the spirit of his enter prise; in what sense is 
linguistic theory restricted if inverse rules are disallowed, but "competing 
underlying forms" are not? 
24sadock (1976) is thus quite rightly bothered by the fact that his 
analysis of Halle 1 s (1959) argument against the phoneme requires that it 
not correspond to a logically valid form of inference. For further discus-
sion of Halle's argument and Sadock's critique , see Churma 1980a 
25This suggestion shares some aspects of other currently proposed 
'concrete' theories of grammar, in which words are listed in the lexicon 
in roughly their surface form (cf. Vennemann 1974b, Leben and Robinson 
1977, Pollack 1977. Farrar 1978). My suggestion seems to differ from these 
proposals in (1) distinguishing nonproductive word-internal processes from 
all others, and (2) claiming that in such cases there are no rules at all, 
whether "via,'' "upside- down", or "redundancy." 
261t has often been pointed out (cf., e . g . , Jeffers 1974, Skousen 
1975) that the term "analogy" has frequently been used carelessly in histor-
ical linguistics. However, if we are careful to make clear exactly what 
the analogy being appealed to is, it seems to me that this concept is ne t 
near]y as 'dangerous' as it has often been claimed to be (cf . King 1969: 
139ff . ). For further discussion along these lines (but in the context 
of historical linguistics), see Jeffers 1974 
27rt is true that there appear to be regularities (at least tendencies) 
concerning which forms are innovated (cf. Kurylowicz 1949, Watkins 1969, 
Hooper 1979). At least some of these tendencies (e . g., Kurylowicz's 'second 
law' that analogy proceeds from "formes de fondation" to "formes fondees") 
can perhaps be seen in terms of the framework suggested above to be the 
result of the (putative) fact that a speaker is more likely, based on consi-
derations of relative frequeocy and perhaps other similar factors to 
know certain kinds of forms than he is to know other kinds (e.g., he would 
be more likely to know a "forme de fondation" than a "forme fondee"). 
References 
Anderson, J . and C. Jones , eds. (1974). Proceedings of the First Interna-
tional Conference on Historical Linguistics . Vol . 2. Amsterdam: 
North Holland . 
Botha, R . (1973) . The Justification of Linguistic Hypotheses. The Hague: 
Mouton . 
Botha, R. (1979a) . External evidence in the validation of mentalistic 
theories : a Chomskyan paradox. Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics 
2:1-38 . 
Botha, R. (1979b). Methodological bases of a progressive mentalism. 
Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics 3 :1-115. 
- 56 -
Brown, E. and R. W. Rieber, eds . (1976) . The Neuropsychology of Language. 
New York: Plenum Press. 
Bruck, A., et al . , eds . (1974) . Papers from the Parasession on Natural 
Phonology. Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic Society. 
Campbell, R. J., et al. , eds. (1974). Linguistic Studies in Romance 
Languages. Washington, D. C. : Georgetown Univ . Press . 
Cole, P . and J . Morgan, eds . (1975) . Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: 
Speech Acts . New York : Academic Press. 
Chao, Y. - R. (1934). The non-uniqueness of phonemic solutions of phonetic 
systems . Bulletin of t he Institute of History and Philology, Academia 
Simica 4:363- 397 . Reprinted in Joos (1957). 
Chomsky, N. (1964) . Current issues in linguistic theory. In Fodor and 
Katz (1964). 
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press . 
Chomsky, N. (1976). On the biological basis of language capacities . I n 
Brown and Rieber (1976) . 
Chomsky, N. (1978). An interview with Noam Chomsky. (S. Saporta , inter-
viewer) . Linguistic Analysis 4:301-319. 
Chomsky, N. and M. Halle (1965) . Some controversial questions in phonologi-
cal theory. Journal of Linguistics 1 :97-138 . 
Chomsky, N. and M. Halle (1968). The Sound Pattern of English . New York: 
Harper and Row . 
Churma , D. (1979). Arguments from External Evidence in Phonology. Unpublished 
Ph .D. Dissertation. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University . 
Churma, D. (1980a). A further remark on the 'Hallean syllogism.' This 
volume. 
Churma, D. (1980b). Some further problems for upside-down phonology . This 
volume . 
Churma, D. (ms.) Rule inversion in Chadic: a closer look. Columbus , OH: 
The Ohio State University . 
Dinnsen, D., ed . (1979). Current Approaches to Phonological Theory. 
Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press. 
Donegan, P. and D. Stampe. (1979) . The study of natural phonology. 
In Dinnsen (1979) . 
Dressler, W. and F. Mares, eds . (1975). Phonologica 1972. Miinchen: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag . 
Farrar, C. (1978) . Phonological regularities in the lexicon. Unpublished 
paper . Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University . 
Fodor, J. and J. Katz, eds . (1964) . The Structure of Language . Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall 
Fujimura, O. , ed. (1973) . Three Dimensions of Linguistic Theory. Tokyo: 
TEC Company , Ltd. 
Goldsmith, J . (1976) . Autosegmental phonology . Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Linguistics Club. 
Grice , H.P . (1975). Logic and conversation. In Cole and Morgan (1975). 
Halle, M. (1959) . The Sound Pattern of Russian . The Hague: Mouton . 
Harris, J . (1974). Morphologization of phonological rules : an example 
from Chicano Spanish . In Campbell, et al ., (1974) . 
Harris, J . (1978) . Two theories of non-automatic morphophonological 
alternation. Language 54 : 41-60 . 
Hooper, J. (1976). Introduction to Natural Generative Phonology. New 
York: Academic Press . 
- 57 -
Hooper, J. (1979). Substantive principles in natural generative phonology. 
In Dinnsen (1979). 
Hudson, G. (1974). The representation of non-productive altGrnations . In 
Anderson and Jones (1974). 
Hudson, G. (1975). Suppletion in the Representation of Alternations. 
Unpublished Ph.D . Dissertation, Los Angeles, CA: UCLA . 
Janda, R. (1980) 'Upside-down' phonology: regenerative or degenerative? 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Linguistics Club. 
Jeffers, R. (1974). On the notion 'explanation' in historical linguistics. 
In Anderson and Jones (1974). 
Jeffers, R. and I. Lehiste (1979). Principles and Methods of Historical 
Linguistics . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Joos, M., ed. (1957). Readings in linguistics I. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Juilland, A., ed. (1977) . Linguistic Studies Offered to Joseph Greenberg. 
Saratoga, CA: Anma Libri. 
Kenstowicz, M. and C. Kisseberth, eds . (1973). Issues in Phonological Theo',. 
The Hague: Mouton . 
King, R. (1969) . Historical linguistics and generative grammar . Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Rall. 
King, R . (1973). Rule insertion. Language 49:551-578. 
Kiparsky, P . (1968) . Linguistic universals and linguistic change. In 
Bach and Harms (1968). 
Kiparsky, P. (1973a). Phonological representations. In Fujimura (1973). 
Kiparsky, P. (1973b). Productivity in phonology . In Kenstowicz and 
Kisseberth (1973) . 
Klingenheben, A. (1928). Die silbenauslautgesetze des Hausa. Zeitschr1ft 
fur eingeborenen Sprachen 18:272-297 . 
Koutsoudas, A. (1972). The strict order fallacy. Language 48:88-96. 
Koutsoudas, A., G. Sanders, and C. Noll. (1974). The application of phono-
logical rules. Language 50:1-28. 
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, second edition. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Kuryiowicz, J. (1949). La nature des proces dits analogiques. Acta 
Linguistica 5:15-37. 
Leben, w. (1973). Suprasegmenta] Phonology . Unpublished Ph.D . Dissertation, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Leben, W. (1974). Rule inversion in Chadic: a reply. Studies in African 
Linguistics 5:265-278. 
Leben, W. (1977a). Doubling and reduplication in Hausa plurals . In 
Juilland (1977) . 
Leben, W. (1977b). Parsing Hausa plurals. In Newman and Newman (1977). 
Leben, W. (1979). The phonological component as a parsing device. In 
Dinnsen (1979) . 
Leben, W. and 0. Robinson. (1977). Upside-down phonology . Language 53: 
1-20. 
Mandelbaum, D., ed . (1949) . Selected writings of Edward Sapir . Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
Newman, P. (1974). The Kanakuru language. (West African Monographs 9) 
Leeds: University of Leeds Dept. of Modern Languages . 
Newman, P. and R. M. Newman, eds . (1977) . Papers in Chadic Linguistics. 
Leiden: Afrika Studiecentrum. 
- 58 -
Peranteau, P., et al . , eds. (1972). Papers from the Eighth Regional Meeting 
of the Chicago Linguistic Society. Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic 
Society. 
Pollack, J. (1977). Lexical features in phonology. Unpublished Ph .D. 
Dissertation. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University . 
Sadock, J. (1976). On significant generalizations: remarks on the 
Hal lean syllogism. I n Wirth (1976). 
Salmon, W. (1967) . The Foundations of Scientific Inference . Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Sapir, E. (1933). La realite psychologique des phonemes. Journal de 
Psychol ogie Normale et Pathologique J0:247-265 . Reprinted in English 
in Mandelbaum (1949). 
Schuh, R. (1972). Rule inversion in Chadic, Studies in African Linguistics 
3:379-97. 
Schuh, R. (1974). A comment on "Rule inversion in Chadic: a reply" . 
Studies in African Linguistics 5:279-280. 
Skousen, R. (1972). On capturing regularities . In Peranteau, et al. 
(1972). 
Skousen, R. (1975). Substantive Evidence in Phonology. The Hague: Mouton. 
Sommerstein, A. (1977). Modern Phonology. Baltimore: University Park Press. 
Stampe, D. (1973). A Dissertation on Natural Phonology. Unpublished Ph .D. 
Dissertation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. 
Suppe, F., ed. (1977) . The Structure of Scientific Theories . Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press . 
Vennemann, T. (1972) . Rule inversion. Lingua 29 :209-242. 
Vennemann, T. (1974a). Restructuring. Lingua 33:137-56. 
Vennemann, T. (1974b). Words and syllables in natural generative grammars. 
In Bruck, et al . (1974). 
Watkins, C. (1969). A further remark on Lachmann's Law . Harvard Studies 
in Classical Philology 74:55-66. 
Zwicky, A, (1975) . The strategy of generative phonology . In Dressler 
and Mares (1975). 
